Rereading the Public: Isolationism and Internationalism Revisited

Abstract

This is the first installment in what we hope will be a recurring series of Forums in ISP.In each segment we intend to provide an outlet for peer-reviewed dialogue and debate on important topics in the field and to allow our readers to discuss material previously printed in the pages of ISP. Below are two comments on "Challenging U.S. Policymakers' Image of an Isolationist Public" by Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay published in ISP 1:1. Both comments raise a number of important issues pertaining to the relationship of public opinion and foreign policy, and also address more general questions of domestic impact on foreign policy outputs and several significant methodological questions about approaches to polling. The Forum begins first with comments by Richard Clark and Kenneth Dautrich, is followed by comments from Shoon Murray, and concludes with a response from Kull and Ramsay.

Globalization, Trade Policy and the Permissive Consensus in Canada

“…Protests have certainly influenced perceived opinion, and trade policy officials are addressing some of the concerns raised by civil society organizations, which is no doubt wise. 3 Yet many elites may have misperceived the state of mass opinion, something that is quite common in the area of international affairs (Kull and Destler 1999;Kull and Ramsay 2000;Page and Barabas 2000;Clark et al 2000). Our data show that the permissive consensus on trade continues and that mass opinion is supportive of new as well as existing trade agreements.…”

Foreign and Domestic Policy Belief Structures in the U.S. and British Publics

“…With a few exceptions (Clark et al 2000;Weissberg 2001), scholars employing rigorous opinion research techniques and sophisticated analytical approaches increasingly have converged on the position that mass views in the United States, including foreign policy attitudes, are systematically linked, more stable, and less isolationist than previously thought (Caspary 1970;Achen 1975;Page 1988, 1994;Hinckley 1991;Page and Shapiro 1992;Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995;Holsti 1996). Although Converse (1964) questioned whether an "elegant high order abstraction," such as the liberal-conservative continuum, was available to the mass public, some research has suggested that ideology does provide horizontal structure for more specific attitudes and beliefs (Bjereld and Ekengren 1999).…”

“…Although there are practical limitations about the levels of interest and expertise and the coherence of belief structures that can be expected among mass publics, there is a developing consensus that even in the area of foreign policy beliefs, early theorists and researchers (Lippmann 1922(Lippmann , 1925Bailey 1948;Morgenthau 1948;Markel 1949;Almond 1950;Kennan 1951) overstated the softness and instability of mass opinion. With a few exceptions (Clark et al 2000;Weissberg 2001), scholars employing rigorous opinion research techniques and sophisticated analytical approaches increasingly have converged on the position that mass views in the United States, including foreign policy attitudes, are systematically linked, more stable, and less isolationist than previously thought (Caspary 1970;Achen 1975;Page 1988, 1994;Hinckley 1991;Page and Shapiro 1992;Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis 1995;Holsti 1996). Although Converse (1964) questioned whether an "elegant high order abstraction," such as the liberal-conservative continuum, was available to the mass public, some research has suggested that ideology does provide horizontal structure for more specific attitudes and beliefs (Bjereld and Ekengren 1999).…”