Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based collaborations

Gansterer, Margaretha; Hartl, Richard F.

doi:10.1007/s00291-015-0411-1

Cited by 50 publications

(49 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…The authors develop a memetic algorithm to solve the problem. However, Gansterer and Hartl (2016b) show that in auction-based exchanges, the best request evaluation criteria take geographical aspects into account. It can be assumed, that these criteria are effective in non-auction-based settings as well.…”

Section: Request Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative vehicle routing: A survey

Gansterer

Hartl

2018

European Journal of Operational Research

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234

113

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In horizontal collaborations, carriers form coalitions in order to perform parts of their logistics operations jointly. By exchanging transportation requests among each other, they can operate more efficiently and in a more sustainable way. Collaborative vehicle routing has been extensively discussed in the literature. We identify three major streams of research: (i) centralized collaborative planning, (ii) decentralized planning without auctions, and (ii) auction-based decentralized planning. For each of them we give a structured overview on the state of knowledge and discuss future research directions.

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Section: Request Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collaborative vehicle routing: A survey

Gansterer

Hartl

2018

European Journal of Operational Research

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234

113

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“…The decision, which requests to offer for trading is investigated by Gansterer and Hartl and Schopka and Kopfer . A critical point is the dimensioning of the auction pool.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The cost of incentive compatibility in auction‐based mechanisms for carrier collaboration

2018

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Collaboration has been one of the important trends in vehicle routing. A typical mechanism to enable carrier collaboration is to use combinatorial auctions, where requests are not traded individually but are combined into bundles. Previous literature on carrier collaboration has focused on issues such as bundle formation or winner determination, typically assuming truthfulness of all agents and absence of any strategic behavior. This article considers the interdependencies and problems that arise from bidders acting as buyers and sellers of requests at the same time. From standard auction theory, desirable properties of exchange mechanisms are identified as efficiency, incentive compatibility, individual rationality, and budget balance. It is shown that these desirable properties cannot be fulfilled at the same time. In particular, the properties efficiency and incentive compatibility induce that budget balance is violated, that is, an outside subsidy is required. We propose two incentive compatible exchange mechanisms. One is more closely related to the classical VCG approach, while the other one uses a more complicated concept for computing payments to participants. A numerical study investigates how frequently desired properties are violated. We show that both mechanisms can be acceptable in practical situations, but none of them can satisfy all desired properties.

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“…Collaborative networks have been studied and developed over the last years, in works like Berger and Bierwirth (2010), Gansterer and Hartl (2016), and Wang and Kopfer (2014). These studies were, however, focusing on single depot per carrier settings.…”

Section: Outlook and Possible Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multidepot pickup and delivery problems in multiple regions: a typology and integrated model

Dragomir

Nicola

Soriano

et al. 2017

Int Trans Operational Res

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The rapid development experienced by the transportation industry in the past decades has led to many configurations of networks and therefore to an explosion of variants in transportation problems, motivating researchers to look at broader logistic problems, beyond the basic vehicle routing problems. This work introduces a new type of problem scenario combining various attributes: a pickup and delivery problem with multiple regions, multiple depots, and multiple transportation modes. We provide definitions, a literature review, and a step‐by‐step construction of the mathematical models from a simple and well‐known scenario to the multiregion multidepot pickup and delivery problem (MR‐MDPDP). For each step the relevant literature is examined. Furthermore, we suggest possible extensions for prospective research.

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Request evaluation strategies for carriers in auction-based collaborations

Cited by 50 publications

References 28 publications

Collaborative vehicle routing: A survey

Collaborative vehicle routing: A survey

The cost of incentive compatibility in auction‐based mechanisms for carrier collaboration

Multidepot pickup and delivery problems in multiple regions: a typology and integrated model

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