Reputational benefits for altruistic punishment

Barclay, Pat

doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.01.003

Cited by 336 publications

(320 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Enforcers thus gain reputational and material benefits that prove advantageous in the long run, whereas non-enforcers do not gain such benefits. This provides a viable solution to the second-order problem of cooperation: Individuals who enforce cooperation norms on transgressors may pay costs and take risks to do so, but they also gain benefits from their group members in return (Barclay, 2006;Fessler & Haley, 2003;Gintis et al, 2001). These gains, along with the increased future cooperation of transgressors, may well benefit the enforcer sufficiently to encourage her to continue enforcing norms in the future, and may serve as an incentive for non-enforcers to begin enforcing norms (see Barclay, 2006;Nelissen, 2008).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This provides a viable solution to the second-order problem of cooperation: Individuals who enforce cooperation norms on transgressors may pay costs and take risks to do so, but they also gain benefits from their group members in return (Barclay, 2006;Fessler & Haley, 2003;Gintis et al, 2001). These gains, along with the increased future cooperation of transgressors, may well benefit the enforcer sufficiently to encourage her to continue enforcing norms in the future, and may serve as an incentive for non-enforcers to begin enforcing norms (see Barclay, 2006;Nelissen, 2008). Our findings thus show that by the preschool years, children demonstrate the capacity (at least in a controlled lab setting) to contribute not only to first-order but also to second-order cooperation, and thus to maintain largescale human cooperation in substantially more sophisticated ways than previously believed.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Some authors have proposed that beyond the second or third order of reward and punishment, additional orders of reward and punishment are likely maintained not through still greater orders of reward and punishment but rather by the reputational benefits gained by the enforcer. That is, unlike costly rewards and punishment, trusting and respecting the enforcer do not require further levels of explanation, since it is in everyone's best interest to value norm enforcers as trustworthy partners and avoid cheating them in order to avoid sanctions (Barclay, 2006). Interestingly, it has been argued that due to cognitive limitations, rewards and punishment likely do not go beyond the second or at the most the third order anyway (e.g., Sripada, 2005).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One possibility is that enforcers receive benefits for their punitive behavior that non-enforcers do not receive (Barclay, 2006;Fessler & Haley, 2003;Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001). For instance, enforcers may be seen to be more committed to the group and its norms, less willing to tolerate norm violations, and more trustworthy than non-enforcers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A few empirical studies have examined the question of how costly norm enforcement could be sustained (e.g., Barclay, 2006;Horita, 2010;Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008;Nelissen, 2008) and have shown that enforcers do typically receive more reputational and material benefits than non-enforcers (though these effects are not unequivocal and adults may even disapprove of particularly severe or aggressive norm enforcement; Eriksson, Andersson, & Strimling, 2016). However, these studies have all involved adults, leaving unclear when in ontogeny this solution to the problem of second-order cooperation becomes functional.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators

et al. 2016

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a b s t r a c tLarge-scale human cooperation among unrelated individuals requires the enforcement of social norms. However, such enforcement poses a problem because non-enforcers can free ride on others' costly and risky enforcement. One solution is that enforcers receive benefits relative to non-enforcers. Here we show that this solution becomes functional during the preschool years: 5-year-old (but not 4-year-old) children judged enforcers of norms more positively, preferred enforcers, and distributed more resources to enforcers than to non-enforcers. The ability to sustain not only first-order but also second-order cooperation thus emerges quite early in human ontogeny, providing a viable solution to the problem of higherorder cooperation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators

et al. 2016

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Reputation

Barclay

2015

The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology

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Humans—like many other organisms—observe others' interactions to gain useful information about who to challenge, avoid, mate with, or cooperate with. Organisms thus benefit from a reputation for being both able and willing to confer benefits on allies and impose costs on competitors. In humans, the existence of language allows for greater spread of information, and has increased the effects that one's reputation has on one's desirability as a partner or fearsomeness as a competitor. This has created selection pressures for high levels of both cooperation and aggression, as well as for behaviors that function to enhance one's own reputation (or decrease the reputation of one's competitors). A better understanding of reputation will allow us to harness social pressures to promote cooperation and decrease aggression, and help build a more comprehensive science of reputation.

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Costly retaliation is promoted by threats to resources in women and threats to status in men

Geniole

Cunningham

Keyes

et al. 2015

Aggressive Behavior

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What motivates people to act against their own self-interest? In men, what seems to be irrational decision-making in the short-term may be explained by other long-term benefits; thus retaliation may not be motivated by tangible costs, but instead intangible psychological variables (e.g., status threats). In contrast, there is evidence that women are more sensitive to tangible costs than are men. In Experiment 1, using the Point Subtraction Aggression Paradigm (PSAP), we tested the prediction that in men, the frequency of provocation, and not the monetary loss (tangible cost), would be associated with retaliation, whereas women would be sensitive to the tangible costs. In keeping with the prediction, women (n = 80) who incurred greater tangible costs (irrespective of frequency) retaliated with more costly punishment, whereas men (n = 90) who were provoked more frequently (irrespective of tangible costs) retaliated with more costly punishment. In Experiment 2, we directly investigated whether women were more sensitive to threats to resources and men were more sensitive to threats to status, as suggested by the results of Experiment 1. Women's (n = 53) retaliation was greater when they reported it to be a means to protect their resources, and men's (n = 35) retaliation was greater when they reported it to be a means to protect their status. Thus, these results identify psychological variables that guide retaliation that is costly to the actor. Consistent with evolutionary perspectives, concerns about status appear to drive costly retaliatory behavior more so in men than in women.

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Reputational benefits for altruistic punishment

Cited by 336 publications

References 26 publications

Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators

Preschoolers value those who sanction non-cooperators

Reputation

Costly retaliation is promoted by threats to resources in women and threats to status in men

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