Reputation and the occurrence and success of mediation in civil wars

Abstract

In this article, we argue that because governments fear that accepting mediation and reaching agreements with opponents may signal weakness to other potential challengers, civil war governments tend to resist mediation as a means of demonstrating their resolve. Building on current theories of reputation in civil war, we argue that the threat of future challenges from other groups is likely to be particularly acute in states with multiple ethnic groups, especially states with high levels of ethnic exclusion. We therefore expect that civil wars in these states will be less likely to see mediation and to produce agreements when they do. By examining all instances of mediation in intrastate conflict from 1990 to 2008, we test this argument empirically and find that mediation is more likely to emerge in civil wars where there are a large number of ethnic groups, but is less likely to occur when many of those ethnic groups are excluded from the political process. Once mediation is underway, however, it is less likely to yield a negotiated settlement when there are a large number of ethnic groups, but more likely to end in a negotiated settlement when many of the ethnic groups are excluded from the political process.

Democratic Third Parties, Conflict Intensity, and International Mediation Tracking

“…Therefore, it is probably an overstatement to say that democracies are the most effective mediators (Dixon 1993, 1994)—they merely select the “easier” cases. My findings also inform the work on reputation in conflict management (e.g., Keels and Greig 2019) and, potentially, peacekeeping (e.g., Andersson 2006). The article concludes with a discussion of policy implications and avenues for future research.…”

“…Its onset is driven by demand and supply‐side incentives in that both the belligerents and the third party must agree on an intervention (e.g., Greig 2005; Beardsley and Greig 2009; Beardsley 2011; Crescenzi, Kadera, and Mitchell 2011). It is well established that mediation is more likely to occur in conflicts that are especially difficult (e.g., Bercovitch and Jackson 2001; Greig 2005; Greig and Regan 2008; Beardsley and Greig 2009; Melin and Svensson 2009; Beardsley 2010; DeRouen Jr, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011; Hellman 2012; Wallensteen and Svensson 2014; Bakaki, Böhmelt, and Bove 2016; Böhmelt 2016; Keels and Greig 2019; Lundgren and Svensson 2020). A key reason for this is that it is precisely these cases that need third‐party assistance to reach a peaceful settlement (see Mehrl and Böhmelt 2021).…”

How mediator leadership transitions influence mediation effectiveness

“…We also control for a number of potentially confounding variables. 8 In selecting these variables, we follow the existing literature on mediation onset and effectiveness in intrastate conflict (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014; see also Keels and Greig, 2019; Lee and Greig, 2019). First, the Cox models include a binary variable indicating whether a conflict has seen mediation or not.…”

“…One of the most comprehensive definitions of international mediation is given by Bercovitch (1997: 130), who sees it as ''a process of conflict management, related to but distinct from the parties' own negotiations, where those in conflict seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an outsider (whether an individual, an organization, a group, or a state) to change their perceptions or behavior, and to do so without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law'' (see also Beardsley, 2011;Keels and Greig, 2019;Lee and Greig, 2019;Wilkenfeld et al, 2019). When mediation helps in addressing the underlying causes of a conflict, settling a dispute, and shortening as well as ending a war, it is usually perceived as an effective approach.…”

“…As indicated, though, our focus is on mediators once an intervention took place, thus departing from earlier works that concentrate on the disputants before a possible mediation. Initially, we assume that problems of information and information asymmetries can make managing and resolving civil conflict difficult (Greig and Regan, 2008; Keels and Greig, 2019; Walter, 2009). Uncertainty about factors that have given rise to a dispute and now characterize fighting dynamics complicates identifying a common ground necessary for fruitful negotiations; and even if an agreement is reached, combatants have an incentive to defect, especially in civil conflicts (Walter, 2009).…”