Reputation and judicial decision-making

Miceli, Thomas J.; Coşgel, Metin M.

doi:10.1016/0167-2681(94)90095-7

Cited by 107 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…The footnotes contain virtually no references to formal models of adjudication and the text never discusses the content of these models. For example, footnote 7 in chapter 1 cites Daughety and Reinganum (1999) and Miceli and Cosgel (1994) for the proposition that economics "has . .…”

Section: Law and Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Choice Attitudinalism? A Review of Epstein, Landes and Posner's <i>The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice</i>

Cameron

Kornhauser

2015

SSRN Journal

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Section: Law and Ideologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Rational Choice Attitudinalism? A Review of Epstein, Landes and Posner's <i>The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice</i>

Cameron

Kornhauser

2015

SSRN Journal

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“…Political and legal scholars have assumed that judges try to make the (ex post) right decision in order to signal their fairness and commitment. For instance, Miceli and Coşgel (1994) envision that judges suffer a utility loss when overturned and gain utility when cited. The disclosure of the firm's information, instead, is less appealing for officials attracted by future job opportunities in the industry (see also Gormley, 1983).…”

Section: E mentioning

confidence: 99%

The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states

Guerriero¹

2013

Journal of Comparative Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The determinants of incentive regulation are a key issue in industrial policy. I study an asymmetric information model of incentive rules selection by a political principal endowed with an information-gathering technology whose efficiency increases with the effort exerted by two accountable supervisors (a regulator and a judge). This set up captures the institutions of several international markets. The model predicts that reforms toward higher powered rules are more likely the more inefficient (efficient) is the production (information-gathering) technology, the less tight is political competition and the greater are pro-consumer supervisors' incentives. This prediction is consistent with evidence based on US electric power market data. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…Precedent is an integral aspect of institutional legitimacy, which becomes particularly significant in salient cases where the prestige of the Court is placed in jeopardy. Some scholars maintain that Court prestige decreases when the Court overturns precedent because of the appearance of the triumph of policy preference over law (Miceli and Cosgel, 1994). Thus, moderate justices are less likely to overturn precedent in salient cases.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The So-Called Moderate Justices on the Rehnquist Court: The Role of Stare Decisis in Salient and Closely-Divided Cases

Foote¹

2010

Journal of Social Sciences

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Problem statement: A major question that has puzzled political scientists is what factors influence the decisions of US Supreme Court justices. Despite 20th Century statutory reforms that have led to a fundamental weakening of institutional cohesion on the Supreme Court, the norm of stare decisis continues to serve as a constraint to moderate decision-makers under certain external conditions. Evaluate voting behavior on the Rehnquist Court to discover which justices are indeed demonstrating moderate behavior. Approach: This research makes a unique contribution by expanding the US Supreme Court Justice-Centered Rehnquist Database (1986Database ( -2000 to include two new variables to measure the level of salience in each case. Therefore, allowing researchers to better access the impact of issue salience in closely divided precedent-setting cases. Both the New York Times and Congressional Quarterly indicators are used to gauge case salience. The analysis focuses on the existing academic and law review literature on the role of precedent and issue salience which may place constraints on the Court. The jurisprudential styles of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and White are analyzed to ascertain similar moderate behavior traits. Since the data is binary, the logistic regression method is applied within the parameters of the moderate judicial model to illuminate the degree of moderate behavior. Results: The findings reveal that Justice Kennedy does not neatly fit the moderate judicial model. Instead, O'Connor was the only justice that consistently demonstrated moderate voting behavior. Interestingly, only Justice White was more likely to maintain precedent in cases that were both salient and closely divided. Conclusion: This work helps close the glaring gap in the prevailing literature by developing a political model which predicts the conditions in which moderate justices are likely to uphold or not uphold precedent. In addition, it provides a more accurate assessment of the current relevance of the norm of stare decisis to the Legal Model.

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Reputation and judicial decision-making

Cited by 107 publications

References 19 publications

Rational Choice Attitudinalism? A Review of Epstein, Landes and Posner's <i>The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice</i>

Rational Choice Attitudinalism? A Review of Epstein, Landes and Posner's <i>The Behavior of Federal Judges: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Rational Choice</i>

The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states

The So-Called Moderate Justices on the Rehnquist Court: The Role of Stare Decisis in Salient and Closely-Divided Cases

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