Reproductive Social Behavior: Cooperative Games to Replace Sexual Selection

Roughgarden, Joan; Oishi, Meeko; Akçay, Erol

doi:10.1126/science.1110105

Cited by 122 publications

(99 citation statements)

References 24 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…If, on the other hand, β 1 = 1, then l1 has equal regard for its partner's payoff (u 2 ) and its own payoff (u 1 ) when determining its actions, and it aims to maximize the product of the two, u 1 u 2 . When β 1 = β 2 = 1, both individuals aim to maximize u 1 u 2 , which is similar to the "team-play" dynamic proposed by Roughgarden et al (7). This behavioral equilibrium, which maximizes the product of the payoffs, coincides with the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) of the game (19).…”

mentioning

confidence: 79%

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

Akçay

Cleve

Feldman

et al. 2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

Self Cite

119

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Although much previous work describes evolutionary mechanisms that promote or stabilize different social behaviors, we still have little understanding of the factors that drive animal behavior proximately. Here we present a modeling approach to answer this question. Our model rests on motivations to achieve objectives as the proximate determinants of behavior. We develop a two-tiered framework by first modeling the dynamics of a social interaction at the behavioral time scale and then find the evolutionarily stable objectives that result from the outcomes these dynamics produce. We use this framework to ask whether "other-regarding" motivations, which result from a kind of nonselfish objective, can evolve when individuals are engaged in a social interaction that entails a conflict between their material payoffs. We find that, at the evolutionarily stable state, individuals can be other-regarding in that they are motivated to increase their partners' payoff as well as their own. In contrast to previous theories, we find that such motivations can evolve because of their direct effect on fitness and do not require kin selection or a special group structure. We also derive general conditions for the evolutionary stability of other-regarding motivations. Our conditions indicate that other-regarding motivations are more likely to evolve when social interactions and behavioral objectives are both synergistic.A nimal behavior is determined both by proximate mechanisms that dictate an animal's actions in real time and by evolutionary forces that shape these proximate mechanisms. Even though the evolutionary dynamics of social behavior have been extensively studied (1-4), proximate mechanisms of behavior and how they interface with evolutionary forces remain poorly understood (4). In recent years, some models have integrated a proximate mechanism with an evolutionary analysis (5, 6). Furthermore, an explicitly two-tiered approach with potentially cooperative behavioral dynamics embedded in an evolutionary dynamic has been proposed (7) as necessary to understand the evolution of social behavior. We contribute to this literature by developing a unified framework for modeling the evolution of a specific type of behavioral interaction based on a well-defined proximate mechanism.Our proximate mechanism is based on the notion that animals are motivated to achieve certain objectives. Goal-seeking behavior has been a recurring theme in animal behavior and has been an integral part of earlier ethological thinking (e.g. 8, 9). However, this idea lost its prominence after the emergence of modern behavioral ecology, which focuses mainly on the fitness consequences of behavior (see, for example, page 6 of ref. 10). In addition, proximate models of behavior based on goal-seeking have focused mostly on nonsocial behaviors such as foraging (9) and have rarely considered social interactions. Here, we study goal-seeking behavior in the context of a social interaction by developing a model of a pair of interacting animals whose motivations ...

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 79%

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

Akçay

Cleve

Feldman

et al. 2009

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

Self Cite

119

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Although established precedent is close to my second objective proposed earlier for the justification we seek for a normative recommendation, I consider picking a precedent (in-group identification) that divides as much as it unites to be unsatisfactory. Such divisions seem particularly dated given that we can expect communication technology to increase the potential size of our social group (Roughgarden et al 2006;Bryson 2015). In the next section I turn as an alternative established source of criteria for making a normative recommendation to philosophy, which I exploit in the sections following to propose a more coherent, minimally disruptive path to situating AI in our society, and (therefore) our ethics.…”

Section: Fundamental Social Behaviourmentioning

confidence: 99%

Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics

Bryson

2018

Ethics Inf Technol

140

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human-or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to.

show abstract

“…We assume that a nodule cannot grow when not receiving carbon fluxes from the plant, so we have, for the fraction of time q that nodule N1 stays in the game, the maximum of the product of r p and r N1 , which in bargaining theory is called the "Nash bargaining solution" (Nash 1950(Nash , 1953 and has been proposed by Roughgarden et al (2006) as an alternative to the Nash equilibrium as an outcome of behavioral dynamics between animals. In the two-nodule case, we are interested in whether and how the plant can use the negotiation process to distinguish between rhizobia of differing mutualistic quality and reward them accordingly, a phenomenon that has variously been termed "plant sanctions" (Denison 2000;West et al 2002c) and "partner choice" (Simms and Taylor 2002).…”

Section: The Negotiation Model With Two Nodulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Negotiation, Sanctions, and Context Dependency in the Legume-Rhizobium Mutualism

Akçay

Simms

2011

The American Naturalist

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Two important questions about mutualisms are how the fitness costs and benefits to the mutualist partners are determined and how these mechanisms affect the evolutionary dynamics of the mutualism. We tackle these questions with a model of the legumerhizobium symbiosis that regards the mutualism outcome as a result of biochemical negotiations between the plant and its nodules. We explore the fitness consequences of this mechanism to the plant and rhizobia and obtain four main results. First, negotiations permit the plant to differentially reward more-cooperative rhizobia-a phenomenon termed "plant sanctions"-but only when more-cooperative rhizobia also provide the plant with good outside options during negotiations with other nodules. Second, negotiations may result in seemingly paradoxical cases where the plant is worse off when it has a "choice" between two strains of rhizobia than when infected by either strain alone. Third, even when sanctions are effective, they are by themselves not sufficient to maintain cooperative rhizobia in a population: less cooperative strains always have an advantage at the population level. Finally, partner fidelity feedback, together with genetic correlations between a rhizobium strain's cooperativeness and the outside options it provides, can maintain cooperative rhizobia. Our results show how joint control over the outcome of a mutualism through the proximate mechanism of negotiation can affect the evolutionary dynamics of interspecific cooperation. Disciplines Biology | Developmental Biology | Evolution CommentsAt the time of publication, author Erol Akçay was affiliated with the University of Tennessee. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Department of Biology at the University of Pennsylvania. Online enhancements: appendix, Mathematica file.abstract: Two important questions about mutualisms are how the fitness costs and benefits to the mutualist partners are determined and how these mechanisms affect the evolutionary dynamics of the mutualism. We tackle these questions with a model of the legumerhizobium symbiosis that regards the mutualism outcome as a result of biochemical negotiations between the plant and its nodules. We explore the fitness consequences of this mechanism to the plant and rhizobia and obtain four main results. First, negotiations permit the plant to differentially reward more-cooperative rhizobia-a phenomenon termed "plant sanctions"-but only when more-cooperative rhizobia also provide the plant with good outside options during negotiations with other nodules. Second, negotiations may result in seemingly paradoxical cases where the plant is worse off when it has a "choice" between two strains of rhizobia than when infected by either strain alone. Third, even when sanctions are effective, they are by themselves not sufficient to maintain cooperative rhizobia in a population: less cooperative strains always have an advantage at the population level. Finally, partner fidelity feedback, together with genetic correlations between a rhizobium strain...

show abstract

Reproductive Social Behavior: Cooperative Games to Replace Sexual Selection

Cited by 122 publications

References 24 publications

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

A theory for the evolution of other-regard integrating proximate and ultimate perspectives

Patiency is not a virtue: the design of intelligent systems and systems of ethics

Negotiation, Sanctions, and Context Dependency in the Legume-Rhizobium Mutualism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About