2009
DOI: 10.1093/beheco/arp050
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Reproductive skew and the evolution of conflict resolution: a synthesis of transactional and tug-of-war models

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Cited by 66 publications
(95 citation statements)
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“…Figure 2 shows that cooperation becomes less likely with increases in the number of parasitic eggs laid by female S and increases in r ns . In both figures, the decreased likelihood of groups forming when primary and secondary female kinship increases is a unique outcome of this model, relative to reproductive skew theory generally, where kinship drops out of the stability conditions entirely (Reeve and Ratnieks 1993;Johnstone 2000;Buston and Zink 2009). This is because even the nesting female gains higher inclusive fitness (and secondary female direct fitness) as long as the number of parasitic eggs E s is sufficiently high.…”
Section: Conditions Under Which a Secondary Female May Breed Cooperatmentioning
confidence: 83%
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“…Figure 2 shows that cooperation becomes less likely with increases in the number of parasitic eggs laid by female S and increases in r ns . In both figures, the decreased likelihood of groups forming when primary and secondary female kinship increases is a unique outcome of this model, relative to reproductive skew theory generally, where kinship drops out of the stability conditions entirely (Reeve and Ratnieks 1993;Johnstone 2000;Buston and Zink 2009). This is because even the nesting female gains higher inclusive fitness (and secondary female direct fitness) as long as the number of parasitic eggs E s is sufficiently high.…”
Section: Conditions Under Which a Secondary Female May Breed Cooperatmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…With three players, we must consider genetic relatedness between three dyad combinations (hostsecondary females, host-primary females, and primarysecondary females) in an approach that is similar to the three-breeder skew model of . We use the framework of previous reproductive skew models that explore the conditions under which a secondary female's "outside option" (here, CBP) affects the solutions for reproductive skew within a cooperatively breeding pair as well as the overall stability of such paired breeding groups (Johnstone 2000;Reeve and Shen 2006;Buston and Zink 2009;Johnstone and Cant 2009). The nesting female (N) is presented with the alternative tactics of (1) accepting female S ("secondary female") to join her in a cooperative nest or (2) rejecting female S to maintain her own solitary nest.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
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