Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra

Can Representationism Explain How Attention Affects Appearances?

“…The most famous instance of this problem, discussed by Block in some earlier writings (Block 1990(Block , 1999(Block , 2007, appeals to the conceivability of spectral inversion, i.e. the idea that the same object might look red to one person but green to another (see also MacPherson 2005 andThompson 2008). I will provide a statement of the arbitrariness problem in terms of several plausible but jointly inconsistent claims (one of them is representationism).…”

“…On this view the content of visual experience is composed of modes of presentation of properties and not of properties themselves. Two visual experiences may differ in content, even though in one sense they are accurate under the same conditions, because they differ in their phenomenal modes of presentation (Thompson 2008, Chalmers 2005 A Fregean view of phenomenal representation has been motivated mostly on the basis of inversion arguments (Thompson 2008, Chalmers 2005. In this case the idea is that Vert's experience might represent the same physical property as Invert's phenomenally different experience because Vert's and Invert's experiences represent that physical property under different phenomenal modes of presentation (roughly, a redish mode of presentation vs. a greenish mode of presentation).…”

Senses for senses

“…His attraction to a dual content view is motivated largely by phenomenological considerations like the ones discussed below in section VI. 7 For discussion of inverted spectra without illusion, see Shoemaker [2001Shoemaker [ , 2002Shoemaker [ , 2006, Tye [2000], and Thompson [2007Thompson [ , 2008. For colour constancy, see Thompson [2006a].…”

On the Asymmetry between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth

“…Proponents of the inverted spectrum hypothesis include Block (, ) and Shoemaker (, , ). For more recent discussion, see Thau, ; Macpherson, ; and Thompson, .…”