Our visual experience of the world often takes the form of events in which objects and/or other aspects of a scene (e.g., the layout) move or change over time. Understanding how the brain processes such "dynamic events" poses a major challenge for theories of perception, memory, and cognition. This Special Issue presents a series of papers related to one topic in this arearepresentational momentum-the systematic tendency for observers to remember an event as extending beyond its actual ending point. For example, when observers view a moving target, that target is typically remembered as having travelled a little farther than it actually did.Representational momentum was first documented by Freyd and Finke (1984), and in their original paradigm, observers viewed three discrete presentations of a rotating rectangle. A brief retention interval (e.g., 250 ms) followed this inducing display and then a fourth, probe, rectangle was presented. Observers were asked to judge if the probe was at the same orientation as the third inducing rectangle. As long as the inducing display implied rotation in a consistent direction, observers were more likely to judge "same" when the probe was actually rotated a little further in the direction of motion. Using a different paradigm, Hubbard and Bharucha (1988) vanishing point using a computer mouse. Typically, the judged vanishing point was slightly in front of the actual vanishing point. Similar dynamic effects have been observed even with completely static stimuli, such as individual images or photographs, when motion is implied within the depicted scene (e.g., Bertamini, 1993;Freyd, 1983;Freyd & Pantzer, 1995; Freyd, Pantzer, & Chang, 1988;Futterweit & Beilin, 1994;Kourtzi & Kanwisher, 2000;Senior et al., 2000).Subsequent investigation revealed a number of variables that influence representational momentum. For example, the implied acceleration (Finke, Freyd, & Shyi, 1986), velocity (Freyd & Finke, 1985Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988), and direction of motion (Halpern & Kelly, 1993;Hubbard, 1990;Munger, Solberg, Horrocks, & Preston, 1999) of a target modulate representational momentum for that target. The implied weight of a target (Hubbard, 1997) and the implied friction experienced by a target (Hubbard, 1995a(Hubbard, , 1998b) also modulate the effect. Information and expectations regarding target identity (Kelly & Freyd, 1987;Reed & Vinson, 1996) or behaviour (Freyd & Finke, 1984;Hubbard, 1994;Hubbard & Bharucha, 1988;Nagai & Yagi, 2001;Verfaillie & d'Ydewalle, 1991) appear to exert an influence on representational momentum, as do aspects of the physical surroundings, such as the presence or behaviour of nearby objects (Hubbard, 1993(Hubbard, , 1995a(Hubbard, , 1998bHubbard, Blessum, & Ruppel, 2001) or landmarks (Hubbard & Ruppel, 1999). Finally, the length of the retention interval between the disappearance of the target and the probing of memory also influences the extent of representational momentum (Freyd & Johnson, 1987).Several explanations of representational momentum have be...