Representation in measurement

Abstract

The Representational Theory of Measurement (RTM) is the best known account of the kind of representation measurement requires. However, RTM has been challenged from various angles, with critics claiming e.g. that RTM fails to account for actual measurement practice and that it is ambiguous about the nature of measurable attributes. In this paper I use the critical literature on RTM to formulate Representation Minimalism – a characterization of what measurement-relevant representation requires at the minimum. I argue that Representation Minimalism avoids the main problems with RTM while acknowledging its usefulness as the formal foundation of representation in measurement.

Measuring the Nonexistent: Validity before Measurement

“…It is worth noting 3 that some (Baccelli 2020; Vessonen 2021) have argued that the RTM should not be understood as a theory of measurement but instead as a theory of measurability. It is, therefore, not a fair criticism to point out that the RTM fails to describe how measurement actually occurs in science.…”