Representation and content in some (actual) theories of perception

Neuro-philosophy meets psychology: Reduction, autonomy, and physiological constraints

“…Although this connection has been granted by some defenders of functionalism, it has been denied by others (see Hatfield, 1988;Kitcher, 1984;Kosslyn & Hatfield, 1984;von Eckardt, 1984). In order to receive a just hearing, functionalism should be evaluated independent of its alleged associates.…”

“…But, second, perhaps as a result of this definition, the multiple realisability argument has seemed to get its force from the possibility that one and the same psychological function could be realised in wildly different hardwares. In opposition to this understanding of functionalism and multiple realisability, I contend that even the standard examples relied upon a usually tacit appeal to "function" in the sense of "biological function" for their argumentative force (see also Hatfield, 1988;Wilkes, 1978, Ch. 4).…”

“…The importance of the functional level of analysis may further be underscored by considering that the analysis of psychological functions provided here allows for the development of notions of representation and computation that are nonsymbolic (as Churchland would like), but that meet the demand that a theory of representation distinguish between mere systematic relation and representation per se. I have argued elsewhere that the notion of representation should be made parasitic upon an account of the function of a particular system (Hatfield, 1988). When a certain functionally characterised ability is imputed to the human cognitive system, computations and representations may need to be posited to carry out this ability.…”

The reality of qualia

“…By contrast with Dretske's approach, I avoid commitment to natural information and am forced to build representational content out of the representational capacities of the organism. In this article, I have merely gestured toward the evolved representational capacities of the brain, which I see as biological functions for representing (see Hatfield, 1988Hatfield, , 1991Hatfield, , 1992. 10 The terminology of color sensations as ''signs'' for ''external qualities'' comes from Hermann Helmholtz (1868Helmholtz ( /1995.…”

Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind

“…I have discussed in earlier papers the grounds for denying that all cognition is symbol-based and for distinguishing representations from symbols (Hatfield, 1988b;Kosslyn & Hatfield, 1984). For nearly a decade, from the time of to , representations typically were equated with symbols and were understood by analogy with the internal states of a digital computer; processing rules were equated with symbolic expressions and were understood by analogy with program instructions in a computer.…”