Report allocation in the European Parliament after eastern enlargement

Hurka, Steffen; Kaeding, Michael

doi:10.1080/13501763.2011.609720

Cited by 25 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…Attendance in plenary sessions has, for example, proven a strong predictor (Yoshinaka et al, 2010;Hurka and Kaeding, 2012;Hurka, Kaeding, and Obholzer, 2015).…”

Section: Effort Leads To Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Striving for influence

Hermansen

2016

Party Politics

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I consider how asymmetric information between the party selectorate and members of Parliament affects the renomination of incumbent candidates. By applying an adverse-selection model I argue that the selectorate looks to past performance to select candidates it expects will gain influence. However, the impact of performance varies according to the need for and availability of information. The European Parliament (EP) provides a most-likely case for information asymmetry. Studying three elections in 11 member states, I find that the allocation of influential positions in office improves chances of reselection. The effect increases when the allocation is more selective, and when the prior uncertainty around candidacies is high. The Moreover, the greater the variation in the candidates' ability, the greater the prior uncertainty around candidacies. This again, increases the effect of performance, as the selectorate needs more information. I test this implication by identifying categories of MEPs whose ability to influence is particularly uncertain.The following study is based on the allocation of safe seats to incumbent members in 11 member-states of the European Union across three elections. The analysis is based on original data on the list placement of 1134 incumbent MEPs, their political background, as well as their effort and performance in office. Results show that

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“…Attendance in plenary sessions has, for example, proven a strong predictor (Yoshinaka et al, 2010;Hurka and Kaeding, 2012;Hurka, Kaeding, and Obholzer, 2015).…”

Section: Effort Leads To Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

Striving for influence

Hermansen

2016

Party Politics

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“…These findings could also be related to the results in a similar area of study on the European Parliament, which looks at how legislative reports are allocated among committee members. Investigating factors affecting rapporteurship allocation, several scholars have found that national factors play a role in these choices too (Kaeding 2004;Hurka and Kaeding 2012). Context might be more crucial than usually believed in this strand of the literature, and we should explore this avenue further.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament and Economic Governance Reform: Does Nationality Matter?

Cencig

Sabani

2017

Open Econ Rev

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This paper analyses MEPs' voting behaviour on all regulations and directives forming the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack together with the key vote required to establish the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Whereas scholarly work has traditionally showed MEPs voting behaviour to be primarily driven by ideology (more specifically, by the MEP's party group affiliation), we expect to find MEPs' national origins to play a counterbalancing role and -at least partially -weaken intra-party position on key economic governance matters, where a conflict of interest might exist between creditor and debtor member countries. Findings confirm that national interests and country-level economic variables can predict MEPs' votes in a considerable number of cases, opening new avenues for future research on territorial cleavages in the European Parliament.

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“…Given their prominent role, one might expect most MEPs to aspire to act as rapporteur on important files. However, despite their acknowledged significance for the outcome of intra‐ and inter‐institutional negotiations, Hurka and Kaeding () find that the odds of becoming rapporteur were significantly lower for MEPs from new Member States in the 2004–09 term. Most importantly, this pattern holds when comparing MEPs from the latest accession countries with first‐time MEPs from the old Member States.…”

Section: After Enlargement: Learning On the Job?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In so doing, we re-evaluate the finding by Hurka and Kaeding (2012) that MEPs from the accession states were less likely to become EP chief negotiators in the 2004-09 term (EP6), and re-examine their argument that this might have been due to a learning phase. This expectation is supported by recent research by Daniel (2013, appendix), who shows that it is common for MEPs from new Member States to be allocated fewer reports in their first term…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament

Hurka

Kaeding

Obholzer

2015

J of Common Market Studies

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This article investigates the determinants of assignments to European Parliament negotiating teams comprising both rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs. We reexamine the argument that under-representation of MEPs (Members of the European Parliament) from new Member States on these key posts after enlargement might have been due to a 'learning phase'. We find that MEPs from newer Member States remain considerably less likely to act as rapporteurs during the second term after enlargement . Most importantly, this trend also holds for shadow rapporteurships under the co-decision procedure, which is when they matter most. This structural under-representation entails important implications for European integration, most importantly that MEPs from newer Member States are less able to influence legislation. We suggest that the patterns we find could be the result of reduced willingness, a more limited skill set, or a structural disadvantage of MEPs from the accession states in the report allocation process.2

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Report allocation in the European Parliament after eastern enlargement

Cited by 25 publications

References 23 publications

Striving for influence

Striving for influence

Voting Behaviour in the European Parliament and Economic Governance Reform: Does Nationality Matter?

Learning on the Job? EU Enlargement and the Assignment of (Shadow) Rapporteurships in the European Parliament

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