Reply to Linton: Perspectival interference up close

Morales, Jorge; Bax, Axel; Firestone, Chaz

doi:10.1073/pnas.2025440118

Cited by 9 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 11 publications

(5 reference statements)

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“…I then discussed an empirical study in Morales et al (2020) that seeks to test perspectivalism with reaction time. This study has generated significant follow‐up discussions (Linton, 2021; Morales et al, 2021), and both new empirical and conceptual investigations are called for. After this, I moved from sight to touch to discuss how we should think about tactile perspectival shapes.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…He further argues that empirically, perhaps the rotated circular objects did not actually look circular, since in Morales et al (2020) the computer-based experiments invoked 2D images and their pictorial cues flatten depicted objects, and the real-world experiments required a viewing distance of 250 cm, in which shape from stereopsis may be compressed. 8 In response, Morales et al (2021) provides both conceptual considerations and a follow-up experiment that addresses the distance worry. The controversies are ongoing, and will keep inspiring both conceptual and empirical works in this ballpark in the years to come 9…”

Section: How To Test Perspectivalism Empiricallymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While there are many different ways to think about such parameters, one traditional view is that the value of the parameter for shape is something like the geometrically defined 2D projection of the distal shape onto a plane approximately parallel to the front of the viewer's face (obviously computed somehow from retinal projections, but in a way that abstracts from details of the actual retinal projection) [also see Cohen, 2010]" (Cohen, 2021). For more details, see https://philosophyofbrains.com/2021/04/13/cognitivescience-of-philosophy-symposium-philosophy-of-perception-in-the-laboratory.aspx 8 These descriptions are by and large from Morales et al (2021), where they nicely summarise the dialectic. 9 At NTU Brain and Consciousness lab we plan to test perspectivalism with the method of fMRI adaptation repetition suppression and see whether neuronal adaptation or stimulus expectation is involved (Larsson & Smith, 2012).…”

Section: Beyond Vision: Perspectival Touch and A Field-based Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spatial representations in sensory modalities

Cheng

2022

Mind & Language

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Some sensory modalities, such as sight, touch and audition, are arguably spatial, and one way to understand these spatial senses is to investigate spatial representations in them. Here I focus on a specific element in this areathe interplay between perspectival variation and spatial constancy-and discuss recent interdisciplinary works on this topic. With these relevant experimental works, we will see clearly how traditional controversies in philosophy, for example, whether we perceive perspectival shapes as well as objective shapes, and whether any sensory field should be postulated in senses other than vision, can benefit from considerations in empirical sciences.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: How To Test Perspectivalism Empiricallymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Beyond Vision: Perspectival Touch and A Field-based Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Spatial representations in sensory modalities

Cheng

2022

Mind & Language

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“…But if this were all that the authors intended, the claim would be obvious. That is, if the authors were to claim merely that there is a viewpoint-dependent shape similarity in how distal shapes are perceptually represented (or in how they appear), the authors would be stating something that is already well-appreciated (see also Morales et al, 2021). If they are claiming something more, as they do throughout much of the article,—namely, that during perception of a rotated distal circle, the elliptical quality that we are aware of is something that is perceived—, then their claim is flatly incorrect.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shape, perspective, and what is and is not perceived: Comment on Morales, Bax, and Firestone (2020).

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Burge²

2023

Psychological Review

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Psychology and philosophy have long reflected on the role of perspective in vision. Since the dawn of modern vision science—roughly, since Helmholtz in the late 1800s—scientific explanations in vision have focused on understanding the computations that transform the sensed retinal image into percepts of the three-dimensional environment. The standard view in the science is that distal properties—viewpoint-independent properties of the environment (object shape) and viewpoint-dependent relational properties (3D orientation relative to the viewer)–are perceptually represented and that properties of the proximal stimulus (in vision, the retinal image) are not. This view is woven into the nature of scientific explanation in perceptual psychology, and has guided impressive advances over the past 150 years. A recently published article suggests that in shape perception, the standard view must be revised. It argues, on the basis of new empirical data, that a new entity—perspectival shape—should be introduced into scientific explanations of shape perception. Specifically, the article’s centrally advertised claim is that, in addition to distal shape, perspectival shape is perceived. We argue that this claim rests on a series of mistakes. Problems in experimental design entail that the article provides no empirical support for any claims regarding either perspective or the perception of shape. There are further problems in scientific reasoning and conceptual development. Detailing these criticisms and explaining how science treats these issues are meant to clarify method and theory, and to improve exchanges between the science and philosophy of perception.

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