Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants

Soames, Scott

doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0486-1

Cited by 61 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(13 reference statements)

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“…In previous works, I have argued for interpreting Russell as endorsing a "substitutional" semantics for quantification, as opposed to an "objectual" semantics (Klement 2004(Klement , 2010(Klement , 2013. I have been surprised by the pushback on this (e.g., Soames 2008Soames , 2014, because the textual evidence strikes me as conclusive. However, there are legitimate worries about what this commits Russell to in terms of the requirements of any adequate language, and whether or not it undermines any alleged advantages of the theory of descriptions.…”

Section: Russell's Views On Quantificationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Russell on Ontological Fundamentality and Existence

Klement

2018

The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

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Until recently, many have perhaps assumed that metaphysics, or at least that branch of it called ontology, is concerned with issues of existence, and that one's metaphysical position is more or less exhausted by one's position on what entities exist. In his "On What There Is", Quine argued that the ontological commitment of a theory or set of views is determined by what things its quantifiers range over: "To be is to be the value of a variable", as he succinctly put it (Quine 1948: 15). Quine's views were never universal, but the weaker assumption that one's ontological commitments are at the center of one's metaphysics is very widespread. Recently there has been some pushback against this broad Quinean framework. Kit Fine has suggested that "we give up on the account of ontological claims in terms of existential quantification" (Fine 2009: 167). Jonathan Schaffer claims that the Quinean approach has created a "tension in contemporary metaphysics" (Schaffer 2009: 354), one that can only be resolved by returning to a more "Aristotelian" conception of metaphysics. The positive proposals of

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Section: Russell's Views On Quantificationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Russell on Ontological Fundamentality and Existence

Klement

2018

The Philosophy of Logical Atomism

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“…5 5 See Hanks (2007b); Hanks (2007a); Hanks (2015, Chapter 1); Hanks (2019b); Soames (2010, Chapters 2, 4); Soames (2014, Chapters 1–2, 7–12); Soames (2016a); Soames (2018b, Chapters 1–4); Soames (forthcoming). …”

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confidence: 99%

Act‐type theories of propositions

Hodgson

2021

Philosophy Compass

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Many philosophers believe in things, propositions, which are the things that we believe, assert etc., and which are the contents of sentences. The act‐type theory of propositions is an attempt to say what propositions are, to explain how we stand in relations to them, and to explain why they are true or false. The core idea of the act‐type theory is that propositions are types of acts of predication. The theory is developed in various ways to offer explanations of the important properties of propositions. I present the core idea of the theory, and some developments of it. I discuss the relationship between the theory and the content–force distinction. I also present an important type of objection that has been raised to the explanations offered by the act‐type theory.

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Soames on ethics: A new vision for the future of analytic philosophy?

Preston

2019

Philos Stud

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Reply to critics of the analytic tradition in philosophy vol. 1 the founding giants

Cited by 61 publications

References 18 publications

Russell on Ontological Fundamentality and Existence

Russell on Ontological Fundamentality and Existence

Act‐type theories of propositions

Soames on ethics: A new vision for the future of analytic philosophy?

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