Reply to Copp, Gaus, Richardson, and Edmundson

Abstract

This piece is a response to four essays that critically discuss my book Democratic Authority. In addition to responding to their specific criticisms, it takes up several methodological issues that put some of the critiques in a broader context. Among the issues discussed are "normative consent," which I offer as a new theory of authority; the "general acceptability requirement," which advances a broadly Rawlsian approach to political justification; and methodological questions about theory building, including a device I dub the "method of provisional leap."

Against Normative Consent

“…What is puzzling about Estlund's treatment of the Direct Authority Objection (along with the arguments of Edmundson and Sreenivasan) is that he fails to consider a much stronger version of the objection-one that would do much more damage to his theory. Estlund (2011) responds to those who believe that there may be a natural duty (or other moral) source to explain every instance of duty supposedly based on normative consent. In contrast, one horn of my dilemma above reveals that there must be a natural duty (or other moral) source to explain every instance of duty based on normative consent.…”

Normative consent and authority 1

“…In previous work I sketched this kind of view(Estlund 2005(Estlund , 2008. I have also defended the view against several critics, but I will not rehearse those exchanges here(Estlund 2009(Estlund , 2010(Estlund , 2011. 3 This definition of authority is not committed to Raz's important view about when and why this moral power is present.…”