Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat

Constantin, Jan

doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01895-y

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 19 publications

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“…Logic could also be not specified with propositions which one can retract or which premise is true-this dichotomy of propositions and their inferences present incompatibility between true logical beliefs. Researchers have also allowed retracting their beliefs in light of incompatibility (Constantin, 2018;Craig, 2000;Shtulman & Young, 2019). Truth logic defines three alethic modalities; necessary (logically consistent), impossible (logically incompatible), and possible (logically consistent but also incompatible).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

Waheed,

Wang,

Waheed

et al. 2023

J. Tert. Educ. Learn.

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College students give true judgment routinely, logicians can infer modal inferences, i.e., inferences that concern three alethic modalities; necessary (⸧), possible (◊), and impossible (⟢) from the premises that are logically consistent and incompatible. To achieve the desired results, logicians have intermingled alethic modalities with logical consistency and incompatibility, i.e., necessary consistent, impossible incompatible, possible consistent, or possible incompatible, and write them in classical modal logic as ⸧C (necessary consistent), ◊C (possible consistent) or ◊I (possibly incompatible) and ⟢I (impossible incompatible). M paradigm [Modality, Mental logic theory (MLT), and Mental model theory (MMT)] have been built to enlighten this truth logic. The basic idea of this study is to examine the theory; how do students judge whether two or more different propositions are possible? and, whether their judgment is true. Truth logic is used to construct some principles that help to justify the above theory. First, inferences have either ◊C/ ◊I or ⸧C but assertions are consistent. Second, each ◊C/ ◊I inference and premise is evaluated for both single and double model assertions, and they have consistency (i.e., ⸧C/◊C) and incompatibility (i.e., ◊I or ⟢I). As logicians have predicted, students mostly endorse inferences as ◊C/ ◊I rather than ⸧C and the ⟢I rate is higher in multi-model assertions. Syllogistic logical reasoning with conditionals (if, then...), conjunctions (and), disjunctions (or), and quantifiers “all” and “some” have been used in the M paradigm to evaluate predictions. Moreover, a computational program and experimental studies have strongly supported the all given principles and predictions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

Waheed,

Wang,

Waheed

et al. 2023

J. Tert. Educ. Learn.

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Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects

Melis

2023

Philosophia

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One emerging issue in contemporary epistemology concerns the relation between animal knowledge, which can be had by agents unable to take a view on the epistemic status of their attitudes, and reflective knowledge, which is only available to agents capable of taking such a view. Philosophers who are open to animal knowledge often presume that while many of the beliefs of human adults are formed unreflectively and thus constitute mere animal knowledge, some of them—those which become subject of explicit scrutiny or are the result of a deliberative effort—may attain the status of reflective knowledge. According to Sanford Goldberg and Jonathan Matheson (2020), however, it is impossible for reflective subjects to have mere animal knowledge. If correct, their view would have a number of repercussions, perhaps most notably the vindication of a dualism about knowledge, which would frustrate attempts to provide a unified account of knowledge-attributions to human adults, very young children, and non-human animals. I discuss Goldberg and Matheson’s proposal, outline some of the ways in which it is insightful, and argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful because it neglects the inherent temporal dimension of knowledge acquisition. While the article is pitched as a reply to Goldberg and Matheson, its primary aim is to highlight significant connections between the debates on the relation between animal and reflective knowledge, propositional and doxastic justification, and the theory of epistemic defeat.

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Replacement and reasoning: a reliabilist account of epistemic defeat

Cited by 2 publications

References 19 publications

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

Truth Logic of Modalities Consistent and Incompatible: A Computational Program and Experimental Studies among College Students

Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects

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