Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies

Friedman, Brandon

doi:10.1080/00263206.2019.1594787

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Rentier state scholars make a further distinction amongst the stable Gulf countries between the wealthier super‐rentiers of Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, and the comparatively less wealthy (but still high income) rentier economies of Saudi Arabia and Oman (Freer, 2018; Herb, 2009). In the former states, the distribution of resource rents has supported extensive welfare systems and public sector employment, employing large expatriate populations in private sector development and the service industry.…”

Section: Public Accountability In Rentier Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theorising the climate change accountability of Persian Gulf petrostates

Mason

2023

Env Pol Gov

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For states with political economies largely dependent on oil and natural gas rents, there seems to be little scope for accountability practices that answer for, and curb, fossil fuel production contributing to anthropogenic climate change. Critically engaging with rentier state theory, I examine the climate change accountability of Persian Gulf petrostates according to state responsibility norms under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). For both domestic and international actions undertaken by these countries, there is no meaningful climate answerability for responsible actions—that they recognise and/or commit to the phasing down of their oil and natural gas production. There are differences in their emission reduction goals, under the Paris Agreement, that map onto variations in the stability and structure of their political economies, notably between the ‘super‐rentier’ states (UAE, Kuwait and Qatar) and their rentier neighbours (Saudi Arabia and Oman). However, all make ritualistic, long‐term commitments to ‘clean‐carbon’ (net zero‐emission) futures with no plans to reduce hydrocarbon exports. I argue that international climate change obligations should include a responsibility on states to reduce GHG emissions (at source) arising from their domestic‐ and foreign ownership of operational oil and gas fields. State energy companies in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere are key actors in fossil fuel extraction, yet remain insulated, through their corporate identities, from state responsibility norms. Treating state ownership of fossil fuels as a legitimate target of international climate regulation would broaden state accountability for climate change harm.

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Section: Public Accountability In Rentier Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Theorising the climate change accountability of Persian Gulf petrostates

Mason

2023

Env Pol Gov

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“…It has spread from the Middle East and Africa to Europe, Central, South and Southeast Asia, including Indonesia (see e.g. Osman, 2017;Berridge, 2018;Freer, 2018;Hegghammer, 2010;Hwang, 2009;Platzdasch, 2009).…”

Section: Islamism In Indonesia and Beyondmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, Freer (2018) argued that the Islamist organization (i.e. Muslim Brotherhood) that operates in wealthy monarchical states of the Arabian Gulf, particularly Qatar, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, have managed to use less-violent or less-militant forms of struggle.…”

Section: Islamism In Indonesia and Beyondmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise of Islamism and the Future of Indonesian Islam

Qurtuby

2020

Journal of International Studies

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Since the downfall of Suharto dictatorial regime in 1998, Indonesia has witnessed the upsurge of various Islamist groups that have in turn potentially threatened the countryâ€™s religious tolerance, civil Islam, and civic pluralism. While some have argued that the rise of these Islamist groupings could turn Indonesia into an intolerant Islamist country, this article argues that the Islamists will likely not be able to transform Indonesia into an Islamic State or Shariaâ€“based government and society, nor receive popular support and winning the heart of Indonesian Muslim majority because of the following fundamental reasons: the groupsâ€™ internal and inherent weaknesses, unsolid alliances among the groups, lack of Islamist political parties, limited intellectual grounds of the movement, the accommodation of some influential Muslim clerics and figures into the central government body, as well as public opposition to the Islamist groups.

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“…It is a catch-all term that includes various different expressions of relating Islam to politics, whether revolutionary, traditionalist or reformist (Esposito, 1997). Also, I am not discussing the way Muslim majority societies handle their Muslim populations through a racialized lens (Bayraklı and Hafez, 2019) or how those countries try to govern what they refer to as 'political Islam' (Freer, 2018). My interest lies in how European governments have used this notion of 'political Islam' or similar alterations such as 'Islamist separatism' in France or 'legalistic Islamism' in Germany to govern their Muslim populations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Criminalizing Muslim agency in Europe: The case of ‘political Islam’ in Austria, Germany, and France

Hafez

2022

French Cultural Studies

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This article discusses the emergence of a discourse on ‘political Islam’ in the policy circles of European elites. It interprets this discourse on one hand as a manifestation of the further criminalization of Muslimness emanating from programs of countering ‘extremism’ and deradicalizing Muslim youth in the wake of the global war on terror. More specifically, the discourse on ‘political Islam’ is seen as an extension of countering violent extremism projects to counter an alleged non-violent ‘extremism.’ The article discusses three cases: Austria, Germany, and France to analyze what the fight against ‘political Islam’ (in Austria), ‘legalistic Islamism’ (in Germany), and ‘Islamist separatism’ (in France) respectively mean. These terminologies are analyzed as ‘empty signifiers’ and (Foucauldian) dispositifs that are used deliberately to legitimize state interventions to shape their respective societies. It is argued that the main shared idea is not that Muslims break the law or commit violence. Rather, the argument is that Muslims use the law to subvert their European nation-states. This aims at excluding Muslims from political life and not allowing them to shape the future of these countries. A simultaneous effort is the nurturing of an unpolitical, submissive Muslim that does not question hegemonial power structures, a project which is pursued by creating a domesticated or ‘national Islam.’ The article discusses these three terminologies' similarities and differences in the respective countries. In sum, the apparatus of ‘political Islam’ is interpreted as a means to 1) push back or exclude Muslims from the public sphere; 2) crackdown on organized Muslims; and 3) silence critical voices to these policies.

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Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Theorising the climate change accountability of Persian Gulf petrostates

Theorising the climate change accountability of Persian Gulf petrostates

The Rise of Islamism and the Future of Indonesian Islam

Criminalizing Muslim agency in Europe: The case of ‘political Islam’ in Austria, Germany, and France

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