Rentier fiscal crisis and regime stability: Business-state relations in the Gulf

The Evolution of Administrative Systems in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar: The Challenge of Implementing Market Based Reforms

“…Kuwaiti rulers have historically used the private sector to guarantee the traditional merchant class their share of oil wealth through government contracts and policies that protect them against foreign investment competition (Moore, ; Smith, ). This unwritten agreement has resulted in what Crystal () calls the “ruler‐merchant pact,” by which the merchants give up their political activism in return for guaranteed access to the state revenues that took many forms.…”

“…Possessing the appropriate connections was particularly rewarding during oil booms, which were times that saw extensive government expenditures in infrastructure building. Because of its small geographical size, land is extremely expensive in Qatar, and having access to the al‐Thani family, who own substantial tracts of land in business districts, is a condition to acquire land (Moore, ).…”

“…Even the appointment of the director of the Qatari Chamber of Commerce is determined by the ruler who invariably appoints an al‐Thani family member. Since the business community is not able to elect its own leader to voice concerns to policy makers, the Chamber of Commerce, in effect, acts more “as [a] government agency than an independent social association” (Moore, :49). This is in stark contrast to the active roles played by the chambers of commerce in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.…”

Kürdistan Bölgesel Yönetimi: Rantçı Devlet Yaklaşımı Çerçevesinde Bir Değerlendirme

“…Moore, özellikle Ortadoğu ülkeleri ekseninde yaptığı değerlendirmede, iş çevreleri ile yönetici elit arasında bir ittifakın oluşturulduğu hallerde, iktidarın dağıtımcı rolünün daha etkin bir şekilde işlediğini belirtmektedir. 25 Yani, ona göre, iktidar ile iş çevreleri arasındaki ilişkiler ne kadar iyiyse, rantçı devlete ilişkin işleyiş de o kadar sağlıklı olmaktadır. Herb ise konuya farklı bir açıdan yaklaşmış ve kamu harcamalarının Gayri Safi Yurtiçi Hâsıla (GSYH) içerisindeki oranı ne kadar yüksekse, o ülkenin rantçı devlet olma ihtimalinin de o kadar fazla olduğunu ifade etmiştir.…”

Une affaire de famille. Reconfiguration du pacte oligarchique dans les monarchies de Bahreïn et d’Abou Dhabi au début du XXI e siècle

“…Les familles d'affaires des six monarchies de la péninsule Arabique (Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn, EAU, Koweït, Oman, Qatar) ont joué un rôle politique central dans la perpétuation de l'ordre autoritaire depuis les années 1970, dans le cadre du pacte oligarchique liant leurs intérêts à ceux des familles royales. En échange de leur consentement à l'ordre politique en place, les bourgeoisies nationales se sont vu garantir de figurer parmi les principaux bénéficiaires des retombées de la rente pétrolière, au travers notamment de l'octroi préférentiel des contrats de travaux publics (Moore, 2002 ;Crystal, 1995). Comme dans le reste du monde arabe (Guazzone et Pioppi, 2009 ;Hibou, 2006 ;Heydemann, 2004), les politiques de libéralisation économique entreprises au cours des décennies 1990 et 2000 dans le Golfe, théoriquement de nature à favoriser l'arrivée de nouveaux acteurs, n'ont pas remis en cause l'ordre établi.…”