Rent-seeking and resource booms

Baland, Jean‐Marie; François, Patrick

doi:10.1016/s0304-3878(00)00067-5

Cited by 273 publications

(152 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…The profits from rent seeking are thus, increasing with respect to the number of entrepreneurs undertaking production. An interesting model with the opposite feature is Baland and Francois (2000). Their result is that because rents are created by import quotas, a greater number of entrepreneurs undertaking production may imply less rents because there are fewer goods that must be imported.…”

Section: Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The main result in the paper, the effects on production and welfare of an increase in natural resources, is discussed in Section 4. Furthermore, since the model is set up so that the same experiments as in Lane and Tornell (1996), Tornell and Lane (1999) and Baland and Francois (2000) may be undertaken, Section 4 also compares the model to these related models. It turns out that the mechanisms highlighted in the present paper provide opposite results to both of these approaches.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare

Torvik

2002

Journal of Development Economics

622

311

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Section: Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare

Torvik

2002

Journal of Development Economics

622

311

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“…Increased entrepreneurship can also crowd out rent seeking. For example, private business can invent and supply new substitutes for restricted imports and thus destroy the rents of quota licenses (Baland and Francois, 2000).…”

Section: Natural Resource Wealth Induces Voracious Rent Seeking 12 Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?

Ploeg

2011

Journal of Economic Literature

1,365

177

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract Are natural resources a "curse" or a "blessing"? The empirical evidence suggests either outcome is possible. The paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in non-democratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: C12, C13, E01, F43, K42, O41, Q30.

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“…After Habakkuk (1962) and Murphy et al (1989) claimed that growth depends on resource abundance, Sachs and Warner (1995) showed that resource abundance can also lead to poor economic performance: the 'curse of resources' hypothesis. The curse can be due to the fact that non-resource sectors are crowded out by overdevelopment of resource sectors ('Dutch disease', see Sachs and Warner, 1999), or can be explained by a rent-seeking argument (Tornell and Lane, 1999;Baland and Francois, 2000). Others have noted, however, that not all countries with abundant resources are cursed, for example Canada, Australia, Norway, and Botswana, and they suggest that the principal force underlying the divergent performance of resource-rich countries is institutional (Mehlum et al, 2006;Sokoloff and Engerman, 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resource Abundance and Resource Dependence in China

Magnus

Wang

2010

SSRN Journal

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This paper reconsiders the 'curse of resources' hypothesis for the case of China, and distinguishes between resource abundance, resource rents, and resource dependence. Resource abundance and resource rents are shown to be approximately equivalent, and their association with resource dependence varies with institutional quality. Resource abundance/rents has a positive impact on economic growth, while resource dependence has a negative impact. The impact of the 'West China Development Drive' policy, started in 2000, is substantial, and this is investigated through a comparative analysis based on cross-section samples, and through a panel-data timevarying coefficient approach for West and East provinces. Resource effects do change after the policy shock.JEL Classification: O11, O13, O53, C21, Q0, Q33.

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Rent-seeking and resource booms

Cited by 273 publications

References 8 publications

Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare

Natural resources, rent seeking and welfare

Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?

Resource Abundance and Resource Dependence in China

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