Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

Cox, Caleb

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.002

Cited by 17 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…If we include interactions between CRT and contest types in the regressions, we observe that the negative relation between CRT and spread seeking is found in all contests except WTA. This observation is somewhat similar to the findings by Cox () and Sheremeta () who find that CRT and GRE, respectively are negatively correlated with overbidding.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 91%

Grind or Gamble? An Experiment on Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests

2019

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We conduct a contest experiment to study if spread seeking and effort can be managed when participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory, we observe higher investments in spread for the winner‐take‐all scheme. Both types of investments can be controlled with a three‐level prize scheme. However, the control management is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia. We also explore the correlation between effort and spread across subjects and find that is robustly positive.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 91%

Grind or Gamble? An Experiment on Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests

2019

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“…we entirely avoid the term “team” in the environment without contest). An alternative setup could have incorporated some form of randomisation on the side of the opponent party in the latter environment as for example in Cox [ 26 ]. We decided against this—and in favour of a static opponent contribution level—to create a setup that excludes all elements emanating from competing with another real group.…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reward and punishment in a team contest

Heine

Strobel

2020

PLoS ONE

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A team contest entails both public good characteristics within the teams as well as a contest across teams. In an experimental study, we analyse behaviour in such a team contest when allowing to punish or to reward other team members. Moreover, we compare two types of contest environment: One in which two teams compete for a prize and another one in which we switch off the between-group element of the contest. We find that reward giving, as opposed to punishing, induces higher contributions to the team contest. Furthermore, expenditures on rewarding other co-players are significantly higher than those for punishing.

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“…We use the computer as the human player's opponent to choose randomly following a fixed probability. Game experiments often use virtual computer players (Brenner & Vriend, 2006;Mccabe, Houser, Ryan, Smith, & Trouard, 2001;Winter & Za-mir, 2005;Houser & Kurzban, 2002;Ferraro, Rondeau, & Poe, 2003;Yamakawa, Okano, & Saijo, 2016;Cox, 2017), which are easy to control. This is a feasible approach because although people may be less altruistic when interacting with the computer than when interacting with a human opponent, the subjects' feedback on how the opponent treats them will not be reduced (Sandoval, Brandstetter, Obaid, & Bartneck, 2016).…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reciprocity in Repeated Emotion Game Experiments: Analyses of a Game-Theoretic Econometric Model

Fan¹,

Li²,

Yunlong³

2020

JSS

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We conducted three treatments of human-computer repeated emotion game experiments and set up a game-theoretic econometric model to measure the impact of emotional reciprocity on behavior at the group level when self-interest is impossible. We found that the subjects still gave feedback in response to the opponent's friendliness (unfriendliness), even if their behaviors could not change their expected payoffs. The subjects' willingness to be altruistic increased in the level of altruism in the environment. However, when the opponent did not respond to their behaviors, the subjects' willingness to be altruistic was lower than their opponents, especially when the opponents behaved more altruistically.

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Rent-seeking and competitive preferences

Cited by 17 publications

References 20 publications

Grind or Gamble? An Experiment on Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests

Grind or Gamble? An Experiment on Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests

Reward and punishment in a team contest

Reciprocity in Repeated Emotion Game Experiments: Analyses of a Game-Theoretic Econometric Model

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