Rendering Interventionism and Non-Reductive Physicalism Compatible

Baumgärtner, Michael

doi:10.1111/1746-8361.12008

Cited by 24 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 46 publications

(105 reference statements)

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“…In section I discussed the consequences of these findings for the discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation. Our findings strengthen Baumgartner's () criticism of Woodward (). Baumgartner concludes that it is unclear how one could provide empirical evidence for a mental property's causal efficacy on physical properties within an interventionist framework.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Summarizing, our findings strengthen Baumgartner's () results. It is not only the case that until now we do not know how to find empirical evidence for

M_{1}

's causal efficacy on P 2 or M 2 within an interventionist framework; rather it seems generally (or theoretically) impossible that

M_{1}

has a causal influence on P 2 or M 2 .…”

Section: Consequences For the Causal Exclusion Debate Within The Intesupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Hence, the correlation between

I_{M_{1}}

and P 2 can only be due to a causal path

I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1} ⟶ P_{2}

, and thus,

I_{M_{1}}

must be a (direct) common cause of

M_{1}

and P 1 such that

I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1}

is productive. So up to this point, we arrive at a consequence close to Baumgartner's (). The main difference is that Baumgartner only showed that it is possible within the modified interventionist framework that

I_{M_{1}}

influences P 2 solely over path

I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1} ⟶ P_{2}

.…”

Section: Consequences For the Causal Exclusion Debate Within The Intesupporting

confidence: 68%

“…Baumgartner () highlights the following shortcoming of Woodward's () modified interventionist theory: One consequence of this theory is that any intervention

I_{M_{1}} = i_{M_{1}}

on the mental property

M_{1}

has to cause both

M_{1}

and its supervenience base P 1 over two different causal paths (

M_{1} ⟵ I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1}

) . So we get

M_{1}

as a direct cause of P 2 if some intervention

I_{M_{1}} = i_{M_{1}}

leads to a change in P 2 .…”

Section: Consequences For the Causal Exclusion Debate Within The Intementioning

confidence: 99%

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Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

Gebharter¹

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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In this paper I reconstruct and evaluate the validity of two versions of causal exclusion arguments within the theory of causal Bayes nets. I argue that supervenience relations formally behave like causal relations. If this is correct, then it turns out that both versions of the exclusion argument are valid when assuming the causal Markov condition and the causal minimality condition. I also investigate some consequences for the recent discussion of causal exclusion arguments in the light of an interventionist theory of causation such as Woodward's (2003) and discuss a possible objection to my causal Bayes net reconstruction.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Summarizing, our findings strengthen Baumgartner's () results. It is not only the case that until now we do not know how to find empirical evidence for

M_{1}

's causal efficacy on P 2 or M 2 within an interventionist framework; rather it seems generally (or theoretically) impossible that

M_{1}

has a causal influence on P 2 or M 2 .…”

Section: Consequences For the Causal Exclusion Debate Within The Intesupporting

confidence: 89%

“…Hence, the correlation between

I_{M_{1}}

and P 2 can only be due to a causal path

I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1} ⟶ P_{2}

, and thus,

I_{M_{1}}

must be a (direct) common cause of

M_{1}

and P 1 such that

I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1}

I_{M_{1}}

influences P 2 solely over path

I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1} ⟶ P_{2}

.…”

Section: Consequences For the Causal Exclusion Debate Within The Intesupporting

confidence: 68%

“…Baumgartner () highlights the following shortcoming of Woodward's () modified interventionist theory: One consequence of this theory is that any intervention

I_{M_{1}} = i_{M_{1}}

on the mental property

M_{1}

has to cause both

M_{1}

and its supervenience base P 1 over two different causal paths (

M_{1} ⟵ I_{M_{1}} ⟶ P_{1}

) . So we get

M_{1}

as a direct cause of P 2 if some intervention

I_{M_{1}} = i_{M_{1}}

leads to a change in P 2 .…”

Section: Consequences For the Causal Exclusion Debate Within The Intementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

Gebharter¹

2015

Philos Phenomenol Research

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“…Rejection of PWC amounts to a constraint on acknowledged causal relationships and has been applied, for instance, in consideration of counterfactual dependency theories of causation (Lewis 1973(Lewis , 2000, in debates on the plausibility of mental causation (Kim 2000;Baumgartner 2013;Woodward 2014), in explanation of the role of dispositions in compound law-governed systems (Hüttemann 2009), and in the mechanists' literature where a division between causal and constitutive relationships could be interpreted as being motivated by a denial of part-whole causation (see,e.g., Craver and Bechtel 2007;Craver 2007;Kaiser and Krickel 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can parts cause their wholes?

Friend

2018

Synthese

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Part-whole causation (PWC) is the thesis that some causes are part of their effects. PWC has been objected to because of its incompatibility with the criterion that causes not be spatially included within their effects and the criterion that causes and effects are ontologically distinct in some sense. This paper serves to undermine the sufficiency of these ways of objecting to PWC by showing that for each criterion either cause-effect relationships need not satisfy it or part-whole relationships can. A case-study of the collapse of Bridge 9340 is employed to facilitate the discussion.

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Interventionism and Mental Surgery

Kaiserman

2018

Erkenn

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John Campbell has claimed that the interventionist account of causation must be amended if it is to be applied to causation in psychology. The problem, he argues, is that it follows from the so-called 'surgical' constraint that intervening on psychological states requires the suspension of the agent's rational autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the problem Campbell identifies is in fact an instance of a wider problem for interventionism, extending beyond psychology, which I call the problem of 'abrupt transitions'. I then defend a solution to the problem, which replaces the surgical constraint with a weaker constraint on interventions that nevertheless does all the work the surgical constraint was designed to do. I conclude by exploring some interesting consequences of this weaker constraint for causation in psychology.

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Rendering Interventionism and Non-Reductive Physicalism Compatible

Cited by 24 publications

References 46 publications

Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

Causal Exclusion and Causal Bayes Nets

Can parts cause their wholes?

Interventionism and Mental Surgery

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