Remuneración y productividad: el caso de la Fundación Hospitalaria del Estado de Minas Gerais, Brasil, 1992­1995

Abstract

This article presents an analysis of the Minas Gerais State Hospital Foundation immediately after the introduction in its health services units in early 1993 of a new system of rewards for good performance and productivity, as a complement to salaried remuneration. Analysis was based on a cross-sectional study of changes in indicators of production and productivity in the Foundation during the 1992-1995 period. Data were obtained from hospitalization authorization forms, payment authorization guides, and bulletins from the Human Resource Administration. The strategy of conditional remuneration and incentives was adopted not only to step up production and productivity, but also to increase the employees' commitment to the institution. Analysis of the selected indicators appears to confirm other study results in that remuneration based on results (conditional incentives) leads to a positive change in the production level of services and productivity, even if it does not last for the long term. Study results also support the notion that such alternatives may be deliberately used as part of a more general strategy of organizational development and not only as an isolated element for concrete improvements in productivity.

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