‘Remixing Rasmussen’: The evolution of Accimaps within systemic accident analysis

Human factors and human reliability

“…Given qualitative characteristics and lack of taxonomy of both Accimap and STAMP (more flexiblity on Accimap), as has already been mentioned, the result was understandable. Low reliability of Accimap and STAMP has been reported by others studies (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008;Underwood and Waterson, 2014;Waterson et al, 2017), but this study more systematically compared the difference.…”

“…The extent to which methods for systemic accident analysis produce outcomes which are valid (e.g., the degree to which the Accimap and STAMP analysis successfully identifies the causes of an accident) and reliable (e.g., the degree to which accident analysts produce similar causal representations) are often viewed as an important criteria for judging their appropriateness for accident analysis (Waterson et al, 2017). According to Underwood and Waterson (2013), a lack of validation is the key issue which may influence the use of the system approach by practitioners.…”

“…In order to systematically compare the four studies, 9 separate categories were used and adapted from Waterson et al, (2017). These covered: (i) the goals and objectives of the study ,e.g.…”

“…The types of methods for accident analysis and investigation that have developed since the 1990's reflect the increasing complexity of socio-technical systems, across a range of domains, including nuclear power production, rail and marine transportation (Waterson et al, 2015;2017). Socalled 'Systemic Accident Analysis' (SAA) draws on sociotechnical systems theory, (e.g., Accimap - Rasmussen, 1997) and control and resilience engineering (e.g., STAMP -Leveson, 2004;FRAMHollnagel, 2004) in order to illustrate the diversity of causal factors contributing to accident across different levels of the systems, interactions between them and the role played by external influences such as political, cultural, financial, and technological circumstances (Branford, 2011).…”

“…

Four studies, two methods and one accident another look at the reliability and validity of STAMP and Accimap for systemic accident analysis his item ws sumitted to voughorough niversity9s snstitutionl epository y theGn uthorF Citation: psvryD eFFqFD txD qFF nd eiyxD FD PHIUF pour studE iesD two methodsD one ident"nother look t the reliility nd vlidity of eimp nd ew for systemi ident nlysisF sxX gepinD wF nd frisD F @edsFA roeedings of the iuropen fety nd eliility gonferene @iE iv PHIUAD ortoro § zD loveniD tune IVEPPndF fo tonD pvX gg ressD ppFUSEVPF Additional Information:• his is n eepted wnusript of pper pulished y gg ress in fety nd eliilityF heory nd epplitions on PS wy PHIUD vilE le onlineX httpsXGGwwwFrpressFomGfetyEndEeliilityEheoryE ndEepplitionsGgepinEfrisGpGookGWUVIIQVTPWQUHF

INTRODUTIONThe types of methods for accident analysis and investigation that have developed since the 1990's reflect the increasing complexity of socio-technical systems, across a range of domains, including nuclear power production, rail and marine transportation (Waterson et al, 2015;2017). Socalled 'Systemic Accident Analysis' (SAA) draws on sociotechnical systems theory, (e.g., AccimapRasmussen, 1997) and control and resilience engineering (e.g., STAMP -Leveson, 2004; FRAMHollnagel, 2004) in order to illustrate the diversity of causal factors contributing to accident across different levels of the systems, interactions between them and the role played by external influences such as political, cultural, financial, and technological circumstances (Branford, 2011).

Systemic Accident Analysis (SAA): validity and reliability

Although SAA are underpinned by sociotechnical systems theory, there are significant differences between them in terms of their theoretical assumptions, the type of causal representation and the outputs they produce.

…”