Remittances, criminal violence and voter turnout

Abstract

How do financial remittances influence electoral participation in violent democracies? Previous work has focused on the 'substitution effect'; if recipients depend on remittances for welfare rather than the state, they become disengaged from formal political processes and less likely to vote in elections. However, while remittances can be used to substitute for state provision of welfare goods, they cannot fully substitute for public security. In this paper, we posit that the ability of governments to contain crime and violence conditions the effect of remittances on electoral participation. Specifically, we argue that high levels of crime can negate the substitution effect and make remittance recipients more likely to vote. Using municipality-level data from Mexico and individual-level data from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, we find that both the receipt of remittances and crime exposure significantly reduce individuals' propensity to vote and that aggregate remittances and crime rates are correlated with lower turnout. Remittances can, however, negate the turnout-suppressing effects of crime, and crime can negate the turnout-suppressing effects of remittances. Our results suggest a need to account for government provision of both substitutable and non-substitutable goods when investigating the effects of remittances on political participation.

Migrant Remittances and Violent Responses to Crime in Latin America and the Caribbean

“…Therefore, we posit that the receipt of remittances will also increase individual approval of giving extra power to state forces to counter crime. This idea is in line with the results of previous research showing that crime and violence scenarios increase the incentives of remittance recipients to participate in elections, as well as their tolerance for military coups in scenarios of rising criminality (Acevedo 2019;López García and Maydom 2019).…”

Migrants’ Remittances, the Fiscal Contract and Tax Attitudes in Africa and Latin America

“…This can lead to a disconnection of remittance recipients from national political affairs, which has been evidenced by studies showing that remittances reduce formal political participation such as electoral turnout (Dionne et. al 2014;Germano 2018;Goodman and Hiskey 2008;López García 2018;López García and Maydom 2021). This reduced interest in national affairs can lead to a decline in a sense of shared national political identity which also reduces tax compliance (Konrad andQari 2012, MacGregor andWilkinson 2012).…”

Do Remittances Contribute to Presidential Instability in Latin America?

“…In the context of high crime, remittances can pay for private protection and vigilantism (Doyle and López García 2021;Ley et al 2021aLey et al , 2021bPérez-Armendáriz and Duquette-Rury 2021). To protect their remittance income, recipients will become more likely than nonrecipients to support aggressive policing and the deployment of the military in public security (López García and Maydom 2021a).…”

“…Yet if recent research finds that remittance inflows respond to different levels of crime and corruption, then we should expect recipients to respond as well. López García and Maydom (2021b) suggest that recipients will favor greater military presence in public security because they feel greater insecurity due to their higher income. Will this underlying insecurity translate to other antidemocratic preferences, such presidential removal via a military coup?…”