Remembering in contradictory minds: Disjunction fallacies in episodic memory.

Abstract

Disjunction fallacies have been extensively studied in probability judgment. They should also occur in episodic memory, if remembering a cue's episodic state depends on how its state is described on a memory test (e.g., being described as a target vs. as a distractor). If memory is description-dependent, cues will be remembered as occupying logically impossible combinations of episodic states (e.g., as being a target and a distractor). Consistent with this idea, memory disjunction fallacies were repeatedly detected in a series of experiments, at the level of individuals as well as at the level of groups. Disjunction fallacies varied as a function of manipulations that should affect description-dependency, such as type of test cue, immediate versus delayed testing, word frequency, and emotional valence. Response bias, as well as description-dependency, contributed to disjunction fallacies, as predicted by fuzzy-trace theory's retrieval model. The significance of these findings for memory is that a new form of episodic distortion, description-dependent memory, has been added to the 2 traditional forms (forgetting and false memory). The significance for probability judgment is that disjunction fallacies, which have customarily been explained as by-products of memory retrieval, may be wholly or partly due to the uncontrolled influence of response bias.

A Hamiltonian Driven Quantum-Like Model for Overdistribution in Episodic Memory Recollection

“…That latter word does not appear in the list and is therefore known as the distractor [21,22]. We will in our approach not include the issue of the preliminary orienting task based on qualifying adjectives as positive, neutral, or negative, which "increase the processing of semantic content during subsequent exposure to word lists" [3]. After this memorization stage either immediate testing ensues or a time delay of a week is inserted.…”

“…A number of experimental paradigms have been proposed to test the over-distribution effect and the episodic disjunction effect. In this paper we mainly refer to Brainerd et al [1,3] which build and expand on "item false memory" and "source false memory" experimental paradigms, but only the former IFM paradigm will be modeled here. We shortly describe both paradigms of 2010 and 2015 for the IFM case.…”

“…In Brainerd et al [3] the disjunction fallacy is modeled for the item false memory paradigm while the source false memory version is covered in Brainerd et al [15]. Brainerd et al [1] exposes the more common case of subadditivity of episodic memory.…”

“…These EOD effects are shown in specifically designed experiments: the item false memory experiment in 2015 is a modification (also [2,3,9]) of a classical paradigm in which a single "instruction" (or probe) would be given to measure whether "a given cue is a target (or not)." EOD-subadditivity.…”

“…The total classical probability of recalling exclusive sub-events most often exceeds the probability of recalling the composed event, i.e., a subadditive total. We present a Hamiltonian driven propagation for the Quantum Episodic Memory model developed by Brainerd et al [1] for the episodic memory overdistribution in the experimental immediate item false memory paradigm [1][2][3]. Following the Hamiltonian method of Busemeyer and Bruza [4] our model adds time-evolution of the perceived memory state through the stages of the experimental process based on psychologically interpretable parameters-γ c for recollection capability of cues, κ p for bias or description-dependence by probes and β for the average gist component in the memory state at start.…”