Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology, by Sanford C. Goldberg.

Malmgren, Anna‐Sara

doi:10.1093/mind/fzs025

Cited by 4 publications

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“…In sum, reflection on the relationship between process‐individuation in the cognitive sciences and systematic fallibility augments the standard epistemological critique of extended epistemology of testimony (Malmgren , Gerken ).…”

Section: Outsourced Cognition and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…This view requires a reformation of orthodox process reliabilism (Goldman , , 2003, Burge , Graham ). Goldberg's proposal has been subject to criticism that I take to severely compromise it (Malmgren , Gerken ). So, here my aim is to connect the issue to the preceding discussion and to cast doubt on the more general prospects of an extended epistemology.…”

Section: Outsourced Cognition and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Outsourced Cognition

Gerken

2014

Philosophical Issues

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Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.

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Section: Outsourced Cognition and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Outsourced Cognition and Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Outsourced Cognition

Gerken

2014

Philosophical Issues

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“…For example, Gerken suggest that the notion of a quasi‐belief dependent process may overliberalize the notion of belief‐dependence, with the result that even perceptual beliefs may end up qualifying as (quasi‐)belief dependent, since they depend on outputs of reliability‐assessable perceptual processes (Gerken ) (cf. Malmgren ). However, in light of the cognitive penetrability of perception (Deroy ; Stokes ), we may already have reason to view the formation of perceptual beliefs as being (strictly) belief dependent, so I do not take the worry about overliberalization to be particularly pressing.…”

Section: Retreating From Virtue Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Jfgi: From Distributed Cognition to Distributed Reliabilism*

Michaelian

2014

Philosophical Issues

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While, prima facie, virtue/credit approaches in epistemology would appear to be in tension with distributed/extended approaches in cognitive science, Pritchard (2010) has recently argued that the tension here is only apparent, at least given a weak version of distributed cognition, which claims merely that external resources often make critical contributions to the formation of true belief, and a weak virtue theory, which claims merely that, whenever a subject achieves knowledge, his cognitive agency makes a significant contribution to the formation of a true belief. But the significance of the role played by the subject's cognitive agency in distributed cognitive systems is in fact highly variable: at one extreme, formation of a true belief seems clearly to be significantly creditable to the subject's agency; at the other extreme, however, the subject's agency plays such a peripheral role that it is at best unclear whether it should receive significant credit for formation of a true belief. The compatibility of distributed cognition and virtue epistemology thus turns on what it takes for a contribution to the formation of true belief to count as significant. This article argues that the inevitable vagueness of this notion suggests retreating from virtue epistemology to a form of process reliabilism and explores the prospects for a distributed reliabilist epistemology designed to fit smoothly with distributed cognition. In effect, distributed reliabilism radicalizes Goldberg's recent extended reliabilist view (Goldberg 2010) by allowing the process the reliability of which determines the epistemic status of a subject's belief to extend to include not

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“…This terminological choice is unfortunate, because it is confusing to call processes that explicitly do not depend on inputbeliefs 'quasi-belief dependent'. More appropriately,Malmgreen (2011Malmgreen ( : 1254 speaks of 'input-dependent' processes.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…For critical discussion of Goldberg's extendedness hypothesis, seeMalmgreen (2011) andGerken (2012).…”

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confidence: 99%

Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By It

Grundmann

2021

Philos Phenomenol Research

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According to Alvin Goldman, reliabilists need to distinguish between unconditionally and conditionally reliable processes. The latter category is used to account for processes such as reasoning or memory. In this paper, I will argue that Goldman’s account of conditional reliability needs substantial revision in two respects. First, conditional reliability must be reinterpreted in terms of dependent reliability to avoid serious problems. Second, we need a more liberal account that allows dependently reliable processes to operate not only on doxastic but also on non‐doxastic input. Thinking this way advances the explanatory power of reliabilism significantly.

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Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology, by Sanford C. Goldberg.

Cited by 4 publications

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Outsourced Cognition

Outsourced Cognition

Jfgi: From Distributed Cognition to Distributed Reliabilism*

Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By It

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