Religious Practice, Brain, and Belief

Livingston, Kenneth R.

doi:10.1163/1568537054068633

Cited by 48 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Although the phenomenology of the experience has been scientifically interpreted as due to 541 abnormal neurological functioning (Livingston, 2005), the lay interpretation of the experience as 542 possession by spirits may appear to reveal an inherent dualistic tendency. 543…”

Section: Conceptions 525 24mentioning

confidence: 99%

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

Barlev¹,

Shtulman²

2019

Preprint

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Disembodied beings are prevalent in present and past religions, from disembodied gods to invisible spirits to immortal souls. Many scholars have explained this prevalence in terms of a quirk in how we initially conceptualize intentional agents, representing their minds as functionally independent of their bodies. Infants are claimed to have both a folkpsychology (for representing the mental states of intentional agents) and a folkphysics (for representing the properties of physical objects) but apply only the folkpsychology to persons. The two modes of construal become integrated with development, but their functional specialization and initial independence makes it easy for people of all ages to entertain the notion that minds can exist without bodies. We critically evaluate this position by scrutinizing the evidence that infants and young children view human minds as functionally independent of human bodies, as well as the evidence that supernatural beings are intuitively represented as minds without bodies. We review evidence from experimental psychology on the representation of intentional agents, both natural and supernatural, as well as the historical and ethnographic literatures on representations of disembodied beings in religion. We argue that representations of minds and bodies are differentiated but functionally integrated from the start, and that conceiving of minds without bodies requires cultural learning. Belief in disembodied beings may be prevalent not because we are developmentally predisposed to entertain such beliefs but because such beliefs are counterintuitive and thus preferentially remembered and socially transmitted.

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Section: Conceptions 525 24mentioning

confidence: 99%

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

Barlev¹,

Shtulman²

2019

Preprint

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“…32 Chen et al,[328][329][330][331][332][333][334][335][336][337][338] Chen et al,329. 34 Epileptic seizures may have a correlation with, if not a causal relationship to, experiences thought of as mystical (Livingston 2005). A correlation can also be found with drug-induced hallucinations (Griffiths et al 2006).…”

Section: The Common Core Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Similar Differences

Simpson

2017

axismundi

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The study of mystical experiences is an endeavor that has been approached in many ways. Philosophy, psychology (cognitive, social, and evolutionary), anthropology and sociology all offer different insights into the phenomenon of reported mystical experiences. 1 Anomalous subjective experiences are reported in almost all of the world's religious traditions as well as outside of religious frameworks. Often, paradoxical and ethereal language is used in conjunction with typical doctrinal or tradition-specific language to describe such experiences. The widespread use of such seemingly extra-traditional, sometimes poetic, and cross-culturally similar language can lead to difficulty in attempting to analyze and interpret claims of such experiences.1 Within this work, the term "mystical" will refer to anomalous subjective experiences. The term will, then, be used in reference to both "experiences of unity with or without a sense of multiplicity" and "experiences of a felt presence whether loving or fearsome" (Taves, p. 20). Abstract:The study of mystical experiences is an endeavor that has been approached in many ways. One unresolved issue in this area of study is whether or not there is a particular type of experience underlying the traditionally religious interpretations, which can be termed "mystical." In this paper, the author posits that some of the foundational claims of the common core view and the social constructivist view of the nature of such experiences, respectively, are not completely incompatible. Rather, the two approaches may converge with regard to the cognitive foundations of cross-culturally accessible anomalous experiences.

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“…Other work in psychology, both theoretical and empirical, provides evidence that claims of self‐loss are fairly common, occur outside of religiously interpreted contexts, and have interesting correlates. For example, a correlation has been suggested between mystical experiences and certain physiological states, specifically, “an individual's propensity for producing [electroencephalogram or EEG] microseizures” (Livingston , 85) in the temporal lobes of the brain. Portions of the temporal lobes are thought to be responsible for various processing, including recognition of objects, face recognition, temporal and spatial designations, and emotional experiences (Livingston , 82–84).…”

Section: Evidence Of Self‐loss Experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Mystical Stance: The Experience of Self‐loss and Daniel Dennett's “Center of Narrative Gravity”

Simpson¹

2014

Zygon

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For centuries, mystically inclined practitioners from various religious traditions have articulated anomalous and mystical experiences. One common aspect of these experiences is the feeling of the loss of the sense of self, referred to as “self‐loss.” The occurrence of “self‐loss” can be understood as the feeling of losing the subject/object distinction in one's phenomenal experience. In this article, the author attempts to incorporate these anomalous experiences into modern understandings of the mind and “self” from philosophy and psychology. Accounts of self‐loss from religious literature along with similar accounts from recent nonreligious writers, suggest that self‐loss accounts are potentially legitimate descriptions and not simply the result of religious apologetics. Specifically, I examine self‐loss through the lens of philosopher Daniel Dennett's theory of “self as the center of narrative gravity.” I argue that Dennett's understanding of the self, if correct, allows for the relegitimation of self‐loss experiences rooted in current views from the psychological literature, rather than rooted in metaphysical religious claims.

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Religious Practice, Brain, and Belief

Cited by 48 publications

References 37 publications

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

Minds, bodies, spirits, and gods: Does widespread belief in disembodied beings imply that we are inherent dualists?

Similar Differences

The Mystical Stance: The Experience of Self‐loss and Daniel Dennett's “Center of Narrative Gravity”

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