Religious fictionalism and the problem of evil

Much of the literature on religious fictionalism has emphasized that religious fictionalists employing a theistic fiction cannot just leave evil out of the fiction, and that on the contrary, they face worries that very closely parallel the worries raised by the problem of evil. This article argues that when religious fictionalism is construed most charitably, these worries do not arise. It explores three fictionalist approaches to evil (Excision, Completeness, and Inconsistency), shows that each can serve religious fictionalist ends, and recommends a pluralist stance towards them.

Section: Alternatives To Excisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Jon Robson (2015) asks whether someone who possesses a certain fictionalist attitude towards theism has anything to fear from the problem of evil. Robson characterizes this attitude as one that is not truth-normed, and thus not belief.…”

Section: Excising Evilmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do religious fictionalists face a problem of evil?

Deng

2023

“…The interpretation of religious language as fiction is commonly taken to imply that religious language is truth-apt but not truth-normed. That a fictional proposition is truth-apt means that it has a truth-value, but since it is not truth-normed the truth-value is not relevant for its use (Robson (2015), 384). For example, when we read J. K. Rowling's work it is irrelevant that propositions like ‘Harry Potter is a wizard’ are strictly speaking false.…”

Section: Religious Language As a Fictional Discoursementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In recent years, proponents of fictionalism have done much to defend and elaborate their views (Le Poidevin (1996); Idem (2003); Idem (2016); Idem (2019); Eshleman (2005); Idem (2010); Deng (2015); Robson (2015)) 2 . However, while much has been said about the first core assumption, there is an unfortunate tendency in the literature to leave the notion of a game of make-believe on the intuitive, pre-theoretical level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pretending to be a believer: on understanding religious fictionalism as a role-playing game

Palmqvist

2022

According to religious fictionalism, a non-believer can participate in religious life by playing a game of make-believe. Considering how games of make-believe build on imagination and pretence, I argue that religious fictionalism requires the non-believing participant to engage in role-playing. Turning to the literature on role-playing games, I demonstrate how religious fictionalism conforms to a qualified definition of such games. I also explore the theoretical consequences of adopting the role-playing perspective, by considering its impact on two key issues concerning religious fictionalism.

“…1.For an account that uses the two terms interchangeably, see Jay (2014). Other philosophers (Harrison (2010); Robson (2015); Sauchelli (2018) ) explicitly use the fictionalist label while relying heavily on resources commonly used in non-doxastic theories, such as epistemic possibility.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Forms of belief-less religion: why non-doxasticism makes fictionalism redundant for the pro-religious agnostic

Palmqvist

2019

Which form of belief-less religion should the agnostic prefer: non-doxasticism which substitutes belief with some weaker cognitive attitude, or fictionalism which standardly treats religious life as a game of make-believe? I argue for non-doxasticism due to its ability to handle the problems associated with fictionalism. However, in an argument for exclusive availability I go further, denying even that the agnostic has a choice: if she has a religious pro-attitude only non-doxasticism is rationally available to her. I also address and reject a recent argument by Finlay Malcolm to the effect that non-doxasticism cannot be properly distinguished from fictionalism.