Religion, Prejudicial Beliefs toward Sexual Minorities and Same-Sex Relations, and Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage: Hate the Sin but Love the Sinner

Escue, Melanie; Cochran, John K.

doi:10.1080/00380237.2020.1823287

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 21 publications

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“…For this reason, it is understood by many as inherently unjust and prejudiced [e.g., [1][2][3]. Empirically, research confirms this understanding, with positive associations observed between same-sex marriage opposition and both direct [4] and indirect [e.g., 5,6] measures of prejudice. In the current paper, however, opposition to samesex marriage, as well as support for it, are examined through a different conceptual and empirical lens.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

“We’re tolerant and they’re prejudiced”: Same-sex marriage supporters’ and opponents’ perceptions of supportive and oppositional claims

Platow,

Knight,

Van Rooy

et al. 2023

PLoS ONE

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The current research examined the proposition that debates over same-sex marriage are characterized, at least in part, by conflicting understandings about what is and is not prejudiced, normative and true. Toward this end, Australians’ (N = 415) prejudice judgements of supportive and oppositional statements toward same-sex marriage were measured and analysed with analyses of variance. Unsurprisingly, same-sex marriage supporters perceived a supportive statement as unprejudiced, tolerant, truthful, in pursuit of individual liberty, and normative; oppositional statements were seen in precisely the opposite manner. Same-sex marriage opponents, however, disagreed, instead judging an oppositional statement as unprejudiced, tolerant, truthful, in pursuit of individual liberty, and normative; it was a supportive statement that was seen as relatively prejudiced. These effects remained even after controlling for independent expressions of in-group favouritism. The current data align with a collective naïve realism perspective, in which group members see their own views as veridical and those of disagreeing others as biased. We argue that prejudice-reduction efforts must be instantiated to facilitate a common in-group identity between supporters and opponents to enable consensus over facts and, ultimately, what is and is not prejudice. Without this consensus, each side of the political debate may simply hurl the pejorative label of “prejudice” against the other, with likely little opportunity for social influence and social change.

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