Religion and Partisan‐Ideological Sorting, 1984–2016*

Davis, Nicholas T.

doi:10.1111/ssqu.12508

Cited by 13 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 56 publications

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“…Scholars have documented the normatively troubling trend of individuals displaying heightened animosity toward the out-party, a phenomenon that leads to judgmental biases, anger, and even discrimination that has been shown to exceed racial hostility (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015). Previous work locates the source of these emotional responses in social identity theory, specifically the alignment of individuals’ ideological, partisan, and even racial and religious identities (Mason, 2015, 2016; Davis, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US

Enders

Lupton

2020

PSRM

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A wealth of research documents the rise of affective polarization, or the increasing disdain for the out-party in American politics. In this paper, we analyze ANES data from 1988 to 2016 to investigate the contribution of core value polarization to the phenomenon of out-party enmity. We find that greater differences in fundamental principles relate significantly to emotionally intense evaluations of the opposing party and its candidates, as well as the ideological out-group, independent of issue attitude extremity and the strength of one's partisan and ideological identities. Moreover, ANES panel data from 1992 to 1996 reveal that past value extremity promotes future affective polarization. These results are important for our understanding of the nature and extent of value-based polarization in American politics.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US

Enders

Lupton

2020

PSRM

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“…A respondent’s age is measured in years, ranging from 17 to 99. Educational attainment conveys the highest level of schooling a respondent has completed and takes the form of a seven-part ordinal scale ranging from 0, “grade school,” to 1, “graduate degree.” The degree to which persons are interested in politics is coded 0 for “not much,” 1 for “some,” and 2 for “a lot.” Because religion is deeply intertwined with political sorting (Davis, forthcoming), I account for the religiosity of respondents. Religiosity is a composite factor of church attendance, views on biblical inerrancy, and the importance of religion.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Perceptions of elites and (asymmetric) sorting

Davis

2018

Research & Politics

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Conventional wisdom suggests that citizens who recognize party polarization exhibit well-sorted preferences. Curiously, however, this extant research has not grappled sufficiently with how pervasive perceptual biases might moderate the relationship between perceptions of elites and sorting. In this manuscript, I show that perceived out-group dissimilarity affects sorting, albeit in an asymmetric manner: perceived out-group dissimilarity corresponds to greater sorting for persons with right-leaning identities compared to those with left-leaning ones. I then analyze the 1992–1996 ANES Panel Study and find that these patterns mostly hold, with one caveat: sorting also shapes perceptions of out-group dissimilarity. These findings offer preliminary evidence of the existence of a feedback loop between perceptions of elites and sorting.

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“…But in the case of the 2016 elections, Djupe and Calfano (2018) find that evangelical elites had little influence. 3 Highly religious evangelicals are also more adept than secular voters at "sorting," drawing links between their ideologies and their appropriate partisan identity (Davis 2018). Further, because evangelicals are attuned to the connection between their beliefs and politics, they are more inclined to become habitual voters-though scholars disagree about whether church attendance is a significant catalyst for participation (Smith and Walker 2013; but see Driskell, Embry, and Lyon 2008).…”

Section: The Multiple Political Identities Of Evangelicalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Polls and Elections: The Skeptical Faithful: How Trump Gained Momentum among Evangelicals

Scala¹

2020

Pres Stud Q

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This article examines the origins of the unlikely alliance between Donald Trump and evangelicals, a relationship that defines the modern-day Republican Party. Using 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study data, I explain how Trump ultimately succeeded among this critical group of Republican primary voters in the contest for the 2016 presidential nomination by exploiting key internal divisions. Trump initially performed well among less educated evangelicals who were less devoted to their religion and less ideologically conservative. Contrary to previous research, I find that Texas senator Ted Cruz's core support among the traditional Christian Right-very conservative, churchgoing evangelicals-resisted Trump until the late stages of the nomination contest. However, Cruz was unable to expand his support among his co-religionists, despite his evangelical identity. Trump's success among evangelicals speaks not only to the oft-cited importance of momentum in presidential nomination contests, but also to the significance of candidate ideology to primary voters, especially when paired with religiosity.

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Religion and Partisan‐Ideological Sorting, 1984–2016*

Cited by 13 publications

References 56 publications

Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US

Value extremity contributes to affective polarization in the US

Perceptions of elites and (asymmetric) sorting

Polls and Elections: The Skeptical Faithful: How Trump Gained Momentum among Evangelicals

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