Religion and Constitutionalism: Oscillations Along a Continuum

Abstract

This review article analyses three books published between 2010 and 2013 and explores the ways in which a nation, secular or otherwise, can deal with religion within its borders, both legally and socially. For many nations, this means employing a foundational document or text, usually a constitution, to exclude religion from, neutrally to structure its participation in, or actively to promote a particular type of it in the public arena. The article develops two primary themes. First, using Ran Hirschl's work, it reveals a continuum of approaches to the constitutional treatment of religion; yet, in plotting those points along the continuum, what one finds is far from precision placement; rather, there is oscillation around several points. Second, in considering specific constitutions, it becomes apparent that the more difficult or ambiguous it is to modify or amend a formal text, the greater the importance assumed by judicially developed interpretative techniques.

Religious Freedom and Education in Australian Schools

“…Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth ('DOGS Case') (1981) 146 CLR 559, 605. A vast scholarly literature has developed around the interpretation of s 116: see, e.g., (Aroney et al 2017;Babie 2007Babie , 2011Babie , 2015Babie , 2017Babie , 2018Babie , 2020Babie and Bhanu 2018;Babie and Rochow 2010;Babie et al 2019;Babie and Krumrey-Quinn 2014;Barker 2015aBarker , 2015bBarker , 2020bBarker , 2020dBeck 2016a, Beck 2016bBeck 2013;Krieg and Babie 2013;Langos and Babie 2020). (Tasmanian Constitutional Law Reform Project 2021).…”