Relief system's last line of defense, only line of defense?

Melhem, G. A.

doi:10.1002/prs.10151

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Overpressure scenarios were considered and relief requirements quantified in accordance with API 521. The primary goals of the analysis and documentation was to ensure that relief devices provided adequate capacity, that the inlet pressure drop and built‐up backpressure were within recommended limits, and that the physical installation met the requirements (eliminate restrictions on the inlet line and absence of pockets in the discharge line, for example) .…”

Section: Risk Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems

Melhem¹,

Houston²

2016

Proc. Safety Prog.

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Recent emphasis on Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practices (RAGAGEP) increased the scope of relief systems risk factors that require evaluation to develop complete and compliant Pressure Relief and Flare Systems documentation. Failure to comply with RAGAGEP ((d)(3)(ii)) is the most cited element of the Process Safety Management requirements. This paper discusses how RAGAGEP considerations now require evaluation and proper documentation of risk factors that are often overlooked including but not limited to: dispersion analysis, thermal radiation, noise, vibration risk, reaction forces and structural supports, metal cold temperatures due to expansion cooling and two phase flow, hot temperatures due to fire exposure and/or runaway reactions, PRV stability, chemical reaction systems, and loss of high pressure/low pressure interface. Important RAGAGEP considerations for these additional risk factors are highlighted and discussed. Recommendations are provided on how to best address these factors in the evaluation and documentation of design basis. © 2016 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 36: 18–23, 2017

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Section: Risk Factorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems

Melhem¹,

Houston²

2016

Proc. Safety Prog.

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“…This is a very challenging requirement since relief systems data are not all "structured data." Data access is required by the OSHA PSM regulation 29 CFR 1910.119 (c)(3) and (p) (1).…”

Section: Relief and Flare Systems Information Availability Requirementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The term RAGAGEP encompasses a wide body of industry codes and standards. Moreover, RAGAGEP defines the standard of care expected of companies by regulatory agencies, government, and society in operating chemical manufacturing (and other) businesses .…”

Section: Introduction and Relief Systems Regulatory Requirements In Tmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A systematic approach to relief and flare systems evaluation

Melhem¹

2013

Process Safety Progress

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The process industries are primarily concerned with the reliability, availability, auditability, and maintainability of relief and flare systems data. These data are critical component of process safety information and its lifecycle must be properly managed to ensure sound process safety management and loss prevention programs. For most large facilities, the process of managing the lifecycle of relief and flare systems data are complex and fraught with challenges and risks, whether the work is performed internally or contracted out. For existing large facilities, the process of relief and flare systems evaluations require mechanical and process data collection, field verification, up to date heat and material balances, information about process safeguards, scenario identification, establishing relief requirements, identification and risk ranking of deficiencies, and managing the corrective actions process for addressing deficiencies where applicable. Reliability is influenced by many technical and human factors including the quality of data, adequacy of tools used for analysis, the qualifications of the relief systems engineers performing the scenario identification, and relief and flare systems evaluations. Availability primarily deals with how quickly can one access accurate and up to date relief and flare systems data. This is especially challenging since relief systems data are not all “structured” data and are interconnected with other engineering data systems. Auditability involves version control and the management of revisions and/or modifications of relief and flare systems that typically result from plant/process modifications, process hazard analysis, incident investigations, etc. Maintainability requires keeping the relief and flare systems data forever green and enabling efficient reviews and revisions. This article describes a systematic web‐based workflow methodology for managing the lifecycle of relief and flare systems data for a single site or at a corporate level. The workflow methodology breaks the flare and relief systems data lifecycle into discrete components and activities, with built‐in review, approval, quality management, and reporting. Built‐in business and engineering rules ensure that all activities can only progress when specific quality criteria are met. This system was developed based on our experience with the execution of many such large scale projects for refineries, chemical, and petrochemical facilities. © 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog 32: 230–238, 2013

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“…These measures can be associated with layers of protection: an external emergency plan, an internal emergency plan, mitigation, prevention (safety valves/bursting discs, safety instrumented systems, etc.) and control (Marszal and Scharpf, 2002;Melhem, 2006). Figure 1-1 shows the different layers of protection of a chemical process.…”

Section: Chapter 1 Introduction 11 Safety Layers In the Process Industrymentioning

confidence: 99%

Safety life cycle analysis applied to the engineering of pressure relief valves in process plants

Basco Montia

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Chemical plants and other industrial installations process and store hazardous materials, which represent a certain risk to people, equipment and the environment. Overpressure is one of the most common upsets in process plants and relief devices (pressure relief valves, rupture discs, overpressure-vacuum valves) are required on process equipment to prevent internal pressures from rising to levels, which could cause catastrophic equipment failure. They are the ultimate line of protection against equipment rupture and are therefore extremely critical safety elements. However, this criticality is not always accounted for in existing plants and in the engineering of new ones, as a lot of pressure relief systems audits performed recently, especially in US, have demonstrated. As an example, a 2014 report from Siemens Energy, Inc. of Houston, pointed out that, after performing 1,197 pressure relief systems audits between 2005 and 2014, consisting of 174,943 pieces of equipment and 80,372 pressure relief devices, 47% of the relief devices had a deficiency, e.g. 13,4% were undersized. In another statistical study focused on the maintenance process of pressure relief valves conducted in 1995 and based on 13,000 items inspected in the workshop, it was found that 18% of the valves only opened at a pressure higher than 110% of the set pressure and 3% did not open at a pressure of twice the set pressure. Therefore, it is clear that a methodology for increasing the reliability of pressure relief devices would be very useful. A new methodology has been developed in this thesis based on an extension of the safety life cycle concept developed for the safety instrumented systems, according to the IEC 61511. This new methodology covers all the steps of the life cycle of a pressure relief valve: a) risk analysis; b) safety requirements specification; c) design; d) reception, installation and checking; e) operation, maintenance and revision; f) management of change; g) decommissioning h) verification and i) documentation and technical audits. This methodology has been applied to three existing petrochemical plants, obtaining results that validate it as a useful tool in the target of increasing the reliability of pressure relief valves. Les plantes químiques i altres instal·lacions industrials processen i emmagatzemen materials perillosos, els quals representen risc per les persones, per els equips i per el medi ambient. La sobrepressió es una de les pertorbacions mes freqüents en les plantes de procés i els dispositius d’alleugeriment de pressió (vàlvules de seguretat, discs de trencament, vàlvules de sobrepressió-buit) són necessaris per prevenir que les pressions internes dels equips a pressió arribin a nivells, que puguin ocasionar la ruptura catastròfica del mateix. Aquests dispositius són l’ultima capa de protecció abans de la ruptura del equip i són, per tant, elements de seguretat molt crítics. Malauradament, aquesta criticitat no se la te sempre en compte en les plantes existents, ni tampoc en la enginyeria i construcció de plantes noves, com moltes auditories de sistemes d’alleugeriment de pressió realitzades recentment, especialment als Estats Units, han demostrat. Per exemple, un informe de Siemens Energy, Inc. de Houston del any 2014, indicava que després de haver realitzat 1197 auditories dels sistemes d'alleugeriment de pressió entre l'any 2005 i 2014, consistint en 174943 equips i 80373 dispositius d’alleugeriment de pressió, un 47% dels dispositius tenien una deficiència, per exemple, 13,4% estaven subdimensionats. En un altre estudi estadístic focalitzat en el manteniment de vàlvules de seguretat realitzat a l’any 1995 i basat en 13000 vàlvules inspeccionades al taller, es va trobar que el 18 % nomes obrien a una pressió mes alta que el 110% de la pressió de tarat i un 3% no obrien ni a una pressió del doble de la tarat. En conseqüència, esta clar que una metodologia per incrementar la fiabilitat dels dispositius d'alleugeriment de pressió seria molt útil. Una nova metodologia s’ha desenvolupat en aquesta tesi basada en una extensió del concepte del cicle de vida de seguretat funcional desenvolupat originalment per els sistemes instrumentats de seguretat, d’acord amb la IEC 61511. Aquesta nova metodologia avarca totes les etapes del cicle de vida d’una vàlvula de seguretat: a) anàlisi del risc, b) especificació dels requisits de seguretat, c) disseny, d) recepció, instal·lació i comprovació, e) operació, manteniment i revisió, f) gestió del canvi, g) donar de baixa h) verificació i i) documentació i auditoria tècnica. Aquesta nova metodologia ha estat aplicada a tres plantes petroquímiques existents, obtenint resultats que la validen com una eina útil per l’objectiu de augmentar la fiabilitat de les vàlvules de seguretat

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Relief system's last line of defense, only line of defense?

Cited by 3 publications

References 9 publications

RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems

RAGAGEP considerations for relief and flare systems

A systematic approach to relief and flare systems evaluation

Safety life cycle analysis applied to the engineering of pressure relief valves in process plants

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