Relief & rehabilitation in complex emergencies

Abstract

Since the late 1980s international aid for development has fallen while humanitarian assistance for emergencies has increased. This change of emphasis reflects the collapse of the USSR and consequent political instability in the former Soviet Union, its former satellites and client states. It also reflects donor disillusion with the failure of many development projects. Much humanitarian assistance is delivered in complex emergencies such as in Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, the Caucasus and former Yugoslavia. Almost without exception these emergencies relate directly to global, regional, national and local political instability created by the ‘new international political order’. Many of the emergencies have roots in the colonial era and a deep history in cultural tensions loosely described as ethnic conflict. Many complex emergencies entail enormous violence, massacres of civilian populations, deliberate destruction of the means of production, ethnic cleansing, torture and rape, displacement of population, refugeedom, social and economic collapse, traumatisation and psycho‐social problems of whole populations and state collapse. Complex emergencies are dynamic, characterised by uncertainty and by rapid and unpredictable changes affecting all aspects of life.

Humanitarian Information Systems and Emergencies in the Greater Horn of Africa: Logical Components and Logical Linkages

“…A schedule for phasing out was determined, and by February 2002 had been agreed by the main partners. This also contrasts with the 1991-2 operations: the lack of a coordinated ENA process allegedly resulted in delays in pulling out (O'Keefe and Kirkby, 1997). Critical questions, however, remained unanswered.…”

“…3 Second, international agencies may take responsibility for humanitarian operations, undermining local authorities' sense of responsibility for welfare. Third, the provision of free or subsidised relief supplies are often associated with various individual and institutional disincentives (O'Keefe and Kirkby, 1997). Thus, in addition to monitoring the same trends as EW, CM must take into account the capacity of local institutions, and causal factors, that explain their capacities.…”

UNTAC in Cambodia: A New Model for Humanitarian Aid in Failed States?

“…One argument in favour of military protection views the goal of humanitarian aid first and foremost as the delivery of a large quantity of supplies to an area in need. To a considerable extent, aid is seen as a top-down, quasi-military operation; and when force is available to ensure access to a vulnerable population, it should be employed (O'Keefe and Kirkby, 1997). From this perspective, 'there is simply no substitute for the armed forces in order to foster a secure environment' (Weiss, 1999: 200).…”