Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency

Hollis‐Brusky, Amanda

doi:10.1515/for-2017-0040

Cited by 6 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Furthermore, my findings address the debate concerning presidential representation by considering representational priorities presidents exhibit through engaging interests, who are both independent actors and manifestations of preferences in the mass public. By engaging more with well-resourced and copartisan interests, my results suggest presidents provide more representation to subgroups that help advance their goals (Druckman and Jacobs 2015;Kriner and Reeves 2015) rather than serving as national representatives (Howell and Moe 2016). Finally, my findings illuminate presidents' role in fostering or tempering the outsized voice upper-class interests enjoy in American politics.…”

mentioning

confidence: 62%

The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

Miller

2022

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Though presidents often criticize organized interests, presidents also expend considerable effort engaging them. Using original elite interviews, a survey of lobbyists, and administrative data, I consider how this engagement manifests, why presidents engage interests, and with which interests presidents engage. Unlike in other institutions, presidents exercise substantial control over engagement with interests, and they engage to mobilize interests’ institutional resources in service of their goals. To optimize mobilization, presidents focus engagement on well-resourced interests and interests who share presidents’ preferences. Pairing over seven million White House visitor log entries from two administrations with lobbying and campaign finance records, I demonstrate that presidential engagement is informed by interests’ electoral and policy resources and partisan alignment, though these characteristics’ substantive effects are modest. My findings highlight coalition building with interests as an underappreciated source of presidential power and elucidate the degree to which presidents amplify the political voice of well-resourced and copartisan interests.

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confidence: 62%

The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

Miller

2022

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…On the United States specifically, a good deal of research has highlighted the importance of unilateral action to the modern presidency (e.g., Howell & Moe, 2016), the lack of durability of these policies (e.g., Thrower, 2017), along with high public expectations for the president to take on the most pressing problems of the day. As Lowi (1985, p. 20) notes, a “new democratic theory” has evolved in which the public as well as other branches of government perceive “that the presidency with all powers is the necessary condition for governing a large, democratic nation.” And although Lowi laments this development by arguing presidents will ultimately disappoint the public due to their unrealistic expectations, other scholars argue that the United States should grant the president an even greater policymaking capacity in order to manage the complex policy challenges facing the country (Howell & Moe, 2016). This article has analyzed only one aspect of concentrating power in the executive, and even within that context, is focused on causally identifying effects that revolve around election cycles in developing democracies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The findings raise broader questions about the potential effects of the concentration of executive power in developed democracies. On the United States specifically, a good deal of research has highlighted the importance of unilateral action to the modern presidency (e.g., Howell & Moe, 2016), the lack of durability of these policies (e.g., Thrower, 2017), along with high public expectations for the president to take on the most pressing problems of the day. As Lowi (1985, p. 20) notes, a "new democratic theory" has evolved in which the public as well as other branches of government perceive "that the presidency with all powers is the necessary condition for governing a large, democratic nation."…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Lowi (1985, p. 20) notes, a "new democratic theory" has evolved in which the public as well as other branches of government perceive "that the presidency with all powers is the necessary condition for governing a large, democratic nation." 23 And although Lowi laments this development by arguing presidents will ultimately disappoint the public due to their unrealistic expectations, other scholars argue that the United States should grant the president an even greater policymaking capacity in order to manage the complex policy challenges facing the country (Howell & Moe, 2016). This article has analyzed only one aspect of concentrating power in the executive, and even within that context, is focused on causally identifying effects that revolve around election cycles in developing democracies.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections

2023

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In recent years, a variety of countries worldwide have experienced an increase in executive power. Long‐standing concerns about this concentration include reduced property rights protection. Particularly for developing democracies, scholars theorize that a lack of institutional constraints on the executive may impede long‐term investment. Analyzing this question empirically has proven difficult, however, because economic activity can affect political institutions and behavior. This article, which analyzes four decades of data from 57 developing democracies, addresses the identification challenges by leveraging elections as a source of exogenous turnover and by accounting for the potential endogeneity of executive institutions. Consistent with the argument that institutional constraints reassure investors, the results suggest that as constraints on the executive increase, investment is less affected by prospective electoral turnover. Moreover, the results are stronger for presidential and semi‐presidential systems with fixed elections, where the chief executive's term cannot be ended early by elections or the legislature, than for parliamentary systems.

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“…A long history of jurisprudence and practice, moreover, establishes that presidents can justifiably lay claim to various powers of removal and oversight (Alvis et al, 2013). And quite independently, there are good reasons to support targeted enhancements of presidential power, particularly in the legislative arena (Howell & Moe, 2016).…”

Section: The Unitary Executive Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power

Howell

Moe

2023

Pres Stud Q

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The strongman presidency presents an acute threat to democracy. Two logics underpin its emergence, both of which implicate the administrative state. Under the first, presidents have sought to deploy the vast resources of the administrative state in pursuit of power and legacy. This logic is symmetric, shaping the behavior of Republican and Democratic presidents alike. The second logic, however, sets them apart. Because most of the administrative state is the embodiment of progressive values, Democratic presidents have approached presidential power in ways that are largely compatible with its well‐being, whereas Republican presidents have laid claim to increasingly extreme powers in order to retrench and sabotage it. Layered on the first, this asymmetric logic is the main driver of the strongman presidency—and, ultimately, a major threat to American democracy.

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Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency

Cited by 6 publications

References 1 publication

The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

The President Will See Whom Now? Presidential Engagement with Organized Interests

Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections

The strongman presidency and the two logics of presidential power

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