Relative rebel strength and the onset and outcome of civil war mediation

Abstract

To what extent does the relative strength of a rebel movement impact upon the likelihood of a peace settlement in civil conflict? This paper argues that relatively stronger rebels are more likely to overcome the strategic bargaining problems that can prevent the resolution of war. Relatively strong insurgents are better equipped to significantly challenge core government interests, and fundamentally threaten the survival a regime. The incumbent's fear of future violence therefore makes mediation more likely to be undertaken in high-stakes conflicts between states and strong rebel groups. Relatively strong insurgencies are also those with the greatest leverage to negotiate enforcement mechanisms, and the best equipped to defend themselves in the event that the government reneges on an agreement. This reduces the scale of the commitment problem and increases the probability of relatively strong rebel groups agreeing to a settlement with an incumbent. This argument is tested using dyadic data that captures the relative position of insurgents in civil war from 1946 to 2004. This represents an important methodological shift within the mediation literature, which has in the past largely relied upon aggregate country-level data. The results suggest that relatively stronger insurgents are more likely to force the state to open a mediation process and eventually concede some form of settlement. This is further evidence of the need to capture the dyadic relations between actors with fine-grained disaggregated data.

Will we see helping hands? Predicting civil war mediation and likely success

“…Our results suggest that ex ante observable structural characteristics can help identify the belligerents willingness to mediate, which largely supports previous mediation research (e.g. Clayton, 2013;Greig and Regan, 2008;Svensson, 2007). In this way our results highlight a number of the key indicators that policymakers can observe to assess the likelihood of mediation in a violent conflict, and how our approach could help intermediaries to assess the prospects for mediation and allocate resources more effectively, thus illustrating the potential contribution of academic forecasting research to policy audiences.…”

“…Incumbents are more likely to resist mediation since admitting a third party to a domestic conflict signals that a state is unable to control its territory and undermines its autonomy (see Clayton, 2013;Greig and Regan, 2008;Melin and Svensson, 2009). Conversely, rebels can gain legitimacy and status as a result of international engagement and thus tend…”

“…In particular, insurgents in territorial conflicts can often challenge the state in a specific area, even if clearly weaker than that the state outside the main the conflict zone. We thus expect territorial conflicts to be more likely to see mediation and settlement (Clayton, 2013). We also consider whether there are parallel conflicts within the state (Kreutz, 2010), since multiple insurgencies can increase the costs associated of mediation to the state.…”

“…Strong insurgents that can credibly threaten an incumbent are more likely to extract concessions from the state (Clayton, 2013;Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009). …”

Oil, relative strength and civil war mediation

“…Petroleum offers a significant source of state revenue that raises the incumbentÕs capacity to resist insurgent demands. This reduces the frequency and effectiveness of mediation, as it is more challenging for relatively weak insurgents to generate the costs that are required to compel the government to accept an intermediary and gain the guarantees against government defection that are needed for a settlement (Clayton 2013;Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). …”