Relative performance of public and private ownership under yardstick competition: electricity retail distribution

Privatização: bom ou ruim? Lições do setor de distribuição de energia elétrica do nordeste brasileiro

“…Já os indicadores técnicos mensuram a qualidade do serviço prestado pelas distribuidoras de energia elétrica aos seus consumidores diretos, que podem ser classificados em residencial, comercial, industrial, rural, poder público e outros. Além disso, a baixa qualidade no serviço gera grandes custos associados, principalmente nas classes de consumo comercial e industrial (LaCOMMARE e ETO, 2006). Os investimentos realizados para adequação dos sistems de subtransmissão e distribuição são capazes de melhorar esses indicadores no médio e longo prazo.…”

Regulatory Agencies : Impact On Firm Performance And Social Welfare

“…As observed by Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) productivity in distribution is, to a large extent, driven by management and efficient labor use; accordingly, the concept of efficiency used through this study is labor-use efficiency (labor productivity): a firm is inefficient if it uses more labor to produce a given bundle of outputs than an otherwise 8 efficient firm would. Our goal, then, is to explain the determinants of labor use, including a variety of technological factors, the characteristics of service, the presence of a regulatory agency, and a set of controls.…”

Regulation and Investment Incentives in Electricity Distribution: An Empirical Assessment

“…Bortolotti et al (2011) study the effect of ownership and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices. Kumbhakar and Hjalmarsson (1998) examine the relative performance of public and private ownership of DSOs in Sweden under yardstick competition during 1970-1990. 8 All electricity distribution companies are regulated via incentive regulation from 2009 onwards in Germany. Consequently, we have no control group (companies which are not under incentive regulation) and we are only able to observe and explain firms' investment behavior over time (before and after the implementation) and are not able to figure out a causal effect of incentive regulation on investment behavior.…”