Relationships Between Dilemma Strength and Fixation Properties in Coevolutionary Games

Abstract

Whether or not cooperation is favored over defection in evolutionary games can be assigned by structure coefficients for any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on any network modeled as a regular graph. We study how these structure coefficients relate to a scaling of dilemma strength in social dilemma games. It is shown that some graphs permit certain arrangements of cooperators and defectors to possess particularly large structure coefficients. Moreover, these large coefficients imply particularly large sections of a bounded parameter plane spanned by scaling gamble-intending and risk-averting dilemma strength.

Evolution of Cooperation for Multiple Mutant Configurations on All Regular Graphs with N ≤ 14 Players

“…A generalization of these discussions can be achieved by the universal scaling approach for payoff matrices that facilitates studying a continuum of social dilemmas [34]. According to this approach a larger value of σ(π, G) implies a larger section of the parameter space spanned by gambleintending and risk-averting dilemma strength [29]. Based on this interpretation of the structure coefficient σ(π, G), we review the following major results of the numerical experiments presented in Sec.…”