Relational Sufficientarianism and Frankfurt’s Objections to Equality

Abstract

This article presents two rejoinders to Frankfurt's arguments against egalitarianism. In developing the first, I introduce a novel relational view of justice: relational sufficiency. This is the view that justice requires us to relate to one another as people with sufficient, but not necessarily equal, standing. I argue that if Frankfurt's objections to distributive equality are sound, so are analogous objections to relational equality. However, in a range of cases involving comparative justice (punishment, equal pay, and family relations) we should be relational egalitarians, not relational sufficientarians, and that we must therefore reject Frankfurt's objections to distributive equality. The second rejoinder takes the form of a demonstration that all of Frankfurt's objections to distributive equality (and relational equality) are unsound. In effect, the article rehabilitates the ideal of distributive equality in the face of Frankfurt's objections.

Relational egalitarianism and moral unequals

“…A great deal has now been written on relational egalitarianism. Prominent works includeAnderson 1999;Bidadanure 2016;Fourie 2012; Fourie et al 2015;Hojlund 2022;Kolodny 2014;Lippert-Rasmussen 2018, 2021a, 2021bMcTernan 2018;Miller 1998;Nath 2011Nath , 2020Satz 2010;Scanlon 2018;Scheffler 2003Scheffler , 2005Scheffler , 2015Schemmel 2012Schemmel , 2021Schmidt 2022;Tomlin 2014;Viehoff 2014Viehoff , 2019Voigt 2018;Wilson 2019;Wolff 1998; Young 1990. 12 For instance, according to luck egalitarianism, individuals' distributive positions should reflect only their relative exercise of responsibility; Lippert-Rasmussen 2015.…”