2009
DOI: 10.1007/s10490-009-9142-7
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Relational exchanges versus arm’s-length transactions during institutional transitions

Abstract: Institutional transitions, Relational exchanges, Arm’s-length transactions,

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Cited by 64 publications
(44 citation statements)
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References 59 publications
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“…On the one hand, if it is national culture that primarily drives strategic choices, the intense reliance on interpersonal relationships may last a long time or at least will not experience a noticeable decline as market reforms deepen, since culture changes relatively slowly (Hofstede, 2007). On the other hand, if it is institutional (under)development that shapes strategic choices, we will probably see a gradually reduced role of interpersonal relationships and a heavier reliance on market-based capabilities as formal market-supporting institutions are gradually implemented (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2007;Dieleman & Sachs, 2006;Li, Sun, & Liu, 2006b;White, 2000;Xu et al, 2006;Zhou & Peng, 2006;Zhou, Li, Zhao, & Cai, 2003). Evidence supportive of the institution-based view, articulated in Peng (2003), is now emerging.…”
Section: Growing the Firm In Chinamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On the one hand, if it is national culture that primarily drives strategic choices, the intense reliance on interpersonal relationships may last a long time or at least will not experience a noticeable decline as market reforms deepen, since culture changes relatively slowly (Hofstede, 2007). On the other hand, if it is institutional (under)development that shapes strategic choices, we will probably see a gradually reduced role of interpersonal relationships and a heavier reliance on market-based capabilities as formal market-supporting institutions are gradually implemented (Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Yeh, 2007;Dieleman & Sachs, 2006;Li, Sun, & Liu, 2006b;White, 2000;Xu et al, 2006;Zhou & Peng, 2006;Zhou, Li, Zhao, & Cai, 2003). Evidence supportive of the institution-based view, articulated in Peng (2003), is now emerging.…”
Section: Growing the Firm In Chinamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, Zhou & Peng (2010) theorize that whether the impact of family ownership and control on firm value is good, bad or irrelevant depends on the level of shareholder protection embodied in the legal and regulatory institutions and these vary across countries. They suggest that in countries with less developed institutions more control through a family CEO or pyramid structure may afford controlling families more opportunities to expropriate funds from minority shareholders (see also Young et al, 2008).…”
Section: The Governance Roles Of Dominant Shareholders and Investor Pmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Well-developed market-supporting institutions may reduce the need for firms to spend time and resources on managerial ties (Danis et al, 2010;Peng, 2003;Zhou & Peng, 2010). Firms in institutionally developed environments can invest more time and resources on productive strategic initiatives (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006).…”
Section: Institutional Efficiency and Strategic Initiativesmentioning
confidence: 99%