Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design

Schöttner, Anja

doi:10.1093/jleo/ewm044

Cited by 61 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The same holds for agent B. 28 The associated …rst-order conditions reveal that the optimal e¤ort of an agent, say agent A, is driven only by the di¤erences in the bonus payments A10 A00 and A11 A01 (similarly for agent B). Thus, in the optimal contract, we will normalize A01 = A00 = B10 = B00 = 0. separable compensation scheme.…”

mentioning

confidence: 91%

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

Mukherjee

Vasconcelos

2011

The RAND J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract. We characterize the optimal job design in a multitasking environment when the …rms rely on implicit incentive contracts (i.e., bonus payments). Two natural forms of job design are compared: (i) individual accountability, where each agent is assigned to a particular job and assumes full responsibility for its outcome; and (ii) team accountability, where a group of agents share responsibility for a job and are jointly accountable for its outcome. The key trade-o¤ is that team accountability mitigates the multitasking problem but may weaken the implicit contracts. The optimal job design follows a cut-o¤ rule: …rms with high reputation concerns opt for team accountability, whereas …rms with low reputation concerns opt for individual accountability. Team accountability is more likely the more acute the multitasking problem is. However, the cut-o¤ rule need not hold if the …rm combines implicit incentives with explicit pay-per-performance contracts.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 91%

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

Mukherjee

Vasconcelos

2011

The RAND J of Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…2 Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) argue that tasks assigned to the same worker should have a similar degree of measurability; otherwise the worker focuses on the task that is easier to measure, leading to a suboptimal allocation of effort across tasks. Schottner (2007) notes that some of the concerns can be mitigated by using relational contracts. Friebel and Yilmaz (2010) show that assigning call centre workers a greater variety of tasks decreases average individual productivity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multitasking

Buser

Péter

2012

Exp Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We examine how multitasking affects performance. We also examine whether individuals optimally choose their degree of multitasking or whether they perform better under an externally imposed schedule. Subjects in our experiment perform two different tasks according to one of three treatments: one where they perform the tasks sequentially, one where they are forced to multitask, and one where they can freely organize their work. Subjects who are forced to multitask perform significantly worse than those forced to work sequentially. Surprisingly, subjects who can freely organize their own schedule also perform significantly worse. These results suggest that scheduling is a significant determinant of productivity. Finally, our results do not support the stereotype that women are better at multitasking. Women suffer as much as men when forced to multitask and are actually less inclined to multitask when being free to choose.

show abstract

“…(2002) and Schöttner (2008). These papers analyze how the presence of contractible modes of governance affects the ability of the parties to rely on implicit contracts.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach

Gürtler

2014

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe analyze the interaction of explicit and implicit contracts in a model with selfish and fair principals. Fair principals are willing to honor implicit agreements, whereas selfish principals are not. Principals are privately informed about their types. We investigate a separating equilibrium in which principals reveal their type through the contract offer to the agent. If this equilibrium is played, explicit and implicit contracts are substitutes. Since the agent learns the principal's type, a selfish principal has to rely on explicit incentives. A fair principal, by contrast, can effectively induce implicit incentives and hence does not need to use explicit incentives. Interestingly, if a selfish principal can rely on more effective explicit incentives, a fair principal becomes more likely to be able to separate from the selfish type and, hence, to make better use of implicit incentives. In this sense, there is a strategic complementarity between explicit and implicit incentives.

show abstract

Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design

Cited by 61 publications

References 31 publications

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

Optimal job design in the presence of implicit contracts

Multitasking

The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts: A signaling approach

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About