Relation between jumping to conclusions and cognitive functioning in people with schizophrenia in contrast with healthy participants

Ochoa, Susana; Haro, Josep María; Huerta‐Ramos, Elena; Cuevas‐Esteban, Jorge; Stephan‐Otto, Christian; Usall, Judith; Nieto, Lourdes López; Brébion, Gildas

doi:10.1016/j.schres.2014.07.026

Cited by 33 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Based on additional equivalence tests, we could not exclude the possibility that women might show reduced evidence integration impairment, more cautious evidence gathering and increased positive response bias compared to men, at a small effect size. Regarding jumping-to-conclusions, sex differences in the observed direction would be consistent with previous reports of better cognitive functioning (Bozikas et al, 2010;Goldstein et al, 1998) and functional outcomes (Leung and Psych, 2000;Ochoa et al, 2012;Roth, 2008), in female patients with psychotic disorders, both of which have been associated with this cognitive bias (Andreou et al, 2015a(Andreou et al, , 2014bFreeman et al, 2014;González et al, 2018;Moritz et al, 2014;Ochoa et al, 2014). However, it should be noted that positive response bias, a bias not associated with delusions, also showed differences between men and women in the present study.…”

Section: Accepted Manuscriptsupporting

confidence: 92%

“…On a similar note, no data on subjects' neuropsychological test performance was available. This may have been of importance as evidence gathering has been found to be dependent upon neurocognitive functioning (Andreou et al, 2015a;Freeman et al, 2014;González et al, 2018;Ochoa et al, 2014). Finally, both samples consisted mainly of young people, which limits the generalizability of results to older individuals, a fact which should be taken into account in future studies.…”

Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Investigation of sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases

Vos

Leanza

Mackintosh

et al. 2019

Psychiatry Research

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This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain. Highlights  Patients with schizophrenia exhibit sex differences in illness characteristics  We investigated sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases  To this purpose, we used data on cognitive biases from two previous studies  We found no sex differences in cognitive biases in patients / healthy controls  Larger sample sizes are needed to exclude sex differences of a small effect size

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Section: Accepted Manuscriptsupporting

confidence: 92%

Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investigation of sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases

Vos

Leanza

Mackintosh

et al. 2019

Psychiatry Research

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“…Many subsequent studies have confirmed this finding (for a review see Garety & Freeman, 2013). However, in much the same way as with theory of mind impairment, these studies have struggled to demonstrate an association with presence or severity of delusions (Dudley et al, 2011; Falcone et al, 2015; Freeman et al, 2014; Garety et al, 2013; Langdon, Ward, & Coltheart, 2010; Lincoln, Ziegler, Mehl, & Rief, 2010; Menon, Pomarol-Clotet, McKenna, & McCarthy, 2006; Moritz & Woodward, 2005; Mortimer et al, 1996; Ochoa et al, 2014; Peters, Thornton, Siksou, Linney, & MacCabe, 2008; So et al, 2012). …”

Section: Theories Of Delusionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can delusions be understood linguistically?

Hinzen

Rosselló

McKenna

2016

Cognitive Neuropsychiatry

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Delusions are widely believed to reflect disturbed cognitive function, but the nature of this remains elusive. The “un-Cartesian” cognitive-linguistic hypothesis maintains (a) that there is no thought separate from language, that is, there is no distinct mental space removed from language where “thinking” takes place; and (b) that a somewhat broadened concept of grammar is responsible for bestowing meaning on propositions, and this among other things gives them their quality of being true or false. It is argued that a loss of propositional meaning explains why delusions are false, impossible and sometimes fantastic. A closely related abnormality, failure of linguistic embedding, can additionally account for why delusions are held with fixed conviction and are not adequately justified by the patient. The un-Cartesian linguistic approach to delusions has points of contact with Frith’s theory that inability to form meta-representations underlies a range of schizophrenic symptoms. It may also be relevant to the nature of the “second factor” in monothematic delusions in neurological disease. Finally, it can inform the current debate about whether or not delusions really are beliefs.

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“…Fatigue may have the capacity to change what the task is measuring, away from the intended variable of the tendency to gather informationalthough that the distractor-sequences group did not significantly change DTD or have large MSE over 10 trials would tend to indicate against this. Nevertheless, the task has not been tested in clinical samples, and it is quite possible that participants with schizophrenia for example, with attendant cognitive deficits (Freeman et al, 2014;Ochoa et al, 2014), may find the extra trials more fatiguing. Thus, the distractor-sequences task would benefit from further validation in both clinical and non-clinical samples.…”

Section: Accepted Manuscriptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards a reliable repeated-measures beads task for assessing the jumping to conclusions bias

McLean

Mattiske

Balzan

2018

Psychiatry Research

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The jumping to conclusions bias (JTC), in which some people gather less information than others before making a decision, has been linked to delusions in psychosis. JTC is usually identified via the beads task, in which a sequence of beads (the "target" sequence) is used to measure the amount of evidence participants require before making a decision. Yet, despite its common use, the reliability of the task has never been properly investigated. We investigated its reliability, and tested an alternate version which used distractor sequences to obfuscate the target sequence. Healthy participants (N = 212) were randomised into two groups. One group completed ten trials using the target sequence, while the other completed ten trials of the target sequence and three distractor sequences. Our data indicated the standard task may not be reliable over repeated measures, but that by including distractor sequences, the task becomes more believable, repeatable, and reliable. Additionally, excluding first-trial data (a "silent" practice trial) also improves repeatability. These improvements to the task are relevant to single trial studies, and will be especially useful to repeated-measures longitudinal, experimental, and treatment studies. Such repeated-measures studies are important for investigating the causal link between JTC and delusions.

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Relation between jumping to conclusions and cognitive functioning in people with schizophrenia in contrast with healthy participants

Cited by 33 publications

References 47 publications

Investigation of sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases

Investigation of sex differences in delusion-associated cognitive biases

Can delusions be understood linguistically?

Towards a reliable repeated-measures beads task for assessing the jumping to conclusions bias

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