Relações entre eficiência técnica das organizações e remuneração a executivos à luz dos impactos da motivação e sensibilidade da remuneração ao desempenho

Uma análise exploratória do papel dos incentivos monetários no desempenho de carbono de empresas brasileiras

“…For Rfmed, we also expect a negative relationship since the investigated companies claim to provide incentives for meeting environmental targets (Guimarães, Peixoto & Carvalho, 2017). Thus, even if the remuneration of Brazilian executives used to be mainly through fixed remuneration, it is acceptable that sustainability targets may be embedded in these fixed remunerations (Dalmácio et al, 2009;Anjos, 2016). Haque & Ntim (2020) Negative…”

“…The identification of the manager's motivation to control and disclose information about GHG emissions can be analyzed from two perspectives: intrinsic motivation (non-monetary) and extrinsic motivation (monetary). Cash bonuses can mainly represent monetary incentives, and non-monetary incentives can be, for example, public recognition usually in awards (Anjos, 2016;Aguiar & Pimentel, 2017).…”

“…Previous research has shown that sustainability targets as carbon performance have long-term nature (Alvarez, 2012) and tend to be more tied to non-fixed incentives, as the risks of poor performance would affect the interests of both the company and the agents (Freeman et al, 2004;Jamali, 2008). In Brazil, for instance, research such as Dalmácio et al (2009) and Anjos (2016) showed that most executive compensation used to be fixed and not motivational in nature. In other words, risks were not shared, considering that they did not vary according to the results achieved.…”