Regulatory Pluralism: Designing Policy Mixes for Environmental Protection

Abstract

One of the most important strategies for protecting the environment is regulation, yet our present regulatory system is often not up to the task. An excessive reliance on “single instrument” approaches is misguided, because all instruments have strengths and weaknesses, and because none are sufficiently flexible and resilient to be able to successfully address all environmental problems in all contexts. Accordingly, a better strategy will seek to harness the strengths of individual mechanisms while compensating for their weaknesses by the use of additional instruments. That is, in the large majority of circumstances, a mix of regulatory instruments is required, tailored to specific policy goals. We cannot assume, however, that all combinations of instruments will be better than a single instrument approach. On the contrary, different combinations of instruments, or the introduction of a new instrument to an existing policy mix, could have a variety of effects, not all of which are positive. This article examines the interactions of different categories of regulatory instruments to determine which combinations are productive, counterproductive, or context specific. The aim is to develop a prescriptive categorization of instrument mixes that will aid policymakers in policy design.

The need for comprehensive and well targeted instrument mixes to stimulate energy transitions: The case of energy efficiency policy

“…[26]). Importantly the early policy design literature often argued for implementing the least intrusive policy measures first and then increasing the level of coercion if needed to achieve policy targets.…”

How policy instruments are chosen: patterns of decision makers’ choices

“…This focus on the pathways followed when selecting specific instruments, is the consequence of the increasing awareness that, as certain studies show, the idea of any coherence between policy instruments and a given ideational framework or goal, or a specific governance mode, has been superseded (Gunningham and Sinclair 1999;Bressers and O'Toole 2005;Howlett 2005;Capano, Reyner, and Zito 2012) for the simple reason that it is empirically fallacious and inconsistent with the facts.…”

Actors in private food governance: the legitimacy of retail standards and multistakeholder initiatives with civil society participation

“…In the food sector, as elsewhere, next to traditional command-and-control, alternative forms of regulation are being explored, such as self-regulation, co-regulation, management-based regulation and other private systems of governance (Aalders and Wilthagen 1997;Braithwaite 1982;Coglianese and Lazer 2003;Furger 1997;Gunningham and Sinclair 1999;Hutter 2001:9-10). In these new forms of regulation, private actors are assuming pivotal roles in terms of rule-making, monitoring compliance, and enforcement.…”