1993
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6288.1993.tb01355.x
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Regulatory Monitoring and the Impact of Bank Holding Company Dividend Changes on Equity Returns

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of announcements of dividend changes by bank holding companies (BHCs) on equity returns. Many empirical studies of dividend behavior reveal positive market responses to dividend increases, which have been interpreted as confirmation of the signalling theory of dividend behavior. These studies typically focus on "large" changes, however. We argue that BHCs allow for a stronger test of signalling theory because regulatory monitors, in effect, "certify" dividend signals. Consequentl… Show more

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Cited by 25 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…In addition to the basic areas affecting financial distress, dividend changes have also long been viewed as a signal of both current and expected future firm prospects. Dividends work as a signal of future growth opportunities and this is consistent with the findings of Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013), Bessler and Nohel (1996), and Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 78%
“…In addition to the basic areas affecting financial distress, dividend changes have also long been viewed as a signal of both current and expected future firm prospects. Dividends work as a signal of future growth opportunities and this is consistent with the findings of Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013), Bessler and Nohel (1996), and Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993).…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 78%
“…A managerial discretion to establish the payout policy can exacerbate the agency problems between managers and shareholders; such conflict is notably more severe in banks because of their highly levered capital structure (John et al 2010). Moreover, according to Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993) and Collins et al, (1994), dividends are usually employed as a signalling mechanism by banks. For example, banks can convey useful information to investors about the bank growth opportunities through dividend payouts (Abreu and Gulamhussen 2013).…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For signaling hypothesis, Filbeck and Mullineaux (1993) examine 177 publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies over the period 1973-1987 and found that unexpected dividend announcements have a direct impact on bank equity valuations. Boldin and Leggett (1995) examined 207 publicly traded U.S. bank holding companies and found empirical evidence that dividend payments increase external ratings of banks.…”
Section: Banking Dividends Literature and Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%