Regulatory Accountability in the Nigerian Telecommunications Sector

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of how the Nigerian Communications Commission, which is responsible for the independent regulation of the Nigerian telecommunications sector, could be made accountable. The need for accountability is relevant given the local context of pervasive corruption and lower expectations of accountability when compared with more mature democracies. The accountability question is analysed in terms of the traditional public accountability mechanisms of executive supervision, legislative oversight and judicial review, highlighting the limits and challenges facing the application of each traditional accountability mechanism to the commission. An extended notion of accountability, specifically the adoption of fair procedures in decision making and accountability to the public at large, are presented as feasibly complementary to traditional accountability mechanisms. Finally the article proposes an amendment to the pre-action conditions to judicial review to facilitate greater accountability.

Bribery and corruption in telecommunications – the case of Nigeria

“…Nigeria was an early adopter of the global trend for regulatory authorities, when the military Babangida Administration created the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC), with the Ministry as policymaker (FGN, 1992; Onwumechili, 2005)[5]. The NCC began operations in September 1993, facing an uphill battle against generals and politicians who neither understood nor accepted its independence, for example, trying to use parliament to push operators to reduce their prices (Peel, 2002; Opata, 2013). NITEL remained state-owned, allowing it to exercise considerable influence, for example, by delaying interconnection with other operators or doing so at high prices and low capacity.…”

“…In common with many countries, Nigeria had created a body to fight corruption, the EFCC, which had been pressed on the FGN by the international financial institutions (IFIs) and aid donors, but faced a very slow judicial system, very little political support and frequent interference in prosecutions (Tayo, 2013; Albert and Okoli, 2016). For example, the EFCC arrested and questioned the head of the NCC for a day, apparently because he had disagreed with the minister by refusing to conduct a spectrum auction, when the minister was barred by statute from directing the NCC, to ensure its independence (Alli, 2009; Osuagwu, 2009; Opata, 2013, pp. 291-295).…”