2012
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-011-9172-1
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Regulation, privatization, and airport charges: panel data evidence from European airports

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Cited by 75 publications
(60 citation statements)
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References 23 publications
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“…Subsequently, the UK Competition Commission appropriately required the owner to sell Gatwick and Stansted airports. Finally, Bilotkach et al (2012) studied sixtyone European airports over an eighteenyear period and found that privatization has reduced aeronautical charges to airlines. 33 33 Similarly, in contrast to U.S. cities, many cities throughout the world have privatized their ports and some evidence exists that privatization has led to efficiency improvements (Tongzon and Heng 2005). Many countries have also restructured their air traffic control providers by granting them managerial and financial autonomy.…”
Section: International Experiencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Subsequently, the UK Competition Commission appropriately required the owner to sell Gatwick and Stansted airports. Finally, Bilotkach et al (2012) studied sixtyone European airports over an eighteenyear period and found that privatization has reduced aeronautical charges to airlines. 33 33 Similarly, in contrast to U.S. cities, many cities throughout the world have privatized their ports and some evidence exists that privatization has led to efficiency improvements (Tongzon and Heng 2005). Many countries have also restructured their air traffic control providers by granting them managerial and financial autonomy.…”
Section: International Experiencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bel and Fageda (2010) find that airlines pay higher aeronautical charges at private and unregulated airports relative to public or private and regulated airports. On the other hand, Bilotkach et al (2012) find that aeronautical charges can be a decreasing function of private involvement in airport management. As pointed out by Bilotkach et al (2012), this may be because private airport operators are more capable in developing concession businesses, which in turn may exert a stronger downward pressure on the private aeronautical charge if private involvement in operations increases.…”
Section: Analysis Of European Airports Is Of Special Interest Becausementioning
confidence: 92%
“…One difficulty with the implementation of dual-till regulation, which has already been pointed out by Beesley (1999), is that the fixed airport costs must be divided into the infrastructure costs and the costs related only to concession businesses. While this adds some arbitrary element to the comparison of single-till regulation and dual-till regulation, for our analysis it is sufficient that the stakeholders somehow agree upon one specific division of the fixed infrastructure costs that 13 Empirical work by Bilotkach et al (2012) supports this analytical prediction.…”
Section: Figure 3 Single-till Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Dual-till represents a relatively recent regulatory innovation, while single-till regulation represents the more traditional approach (Bilotkach et al, 2012). One difficulty with the implementation of dual-till regulation, which has already been pointed out by Beesley (1999), is that the fixed airport costs must be divided into the infrastructure costs and the costs related only to concession businesses.…”
Section: Figure 3 Single-till Regulationmentioning
confidence: 99%