Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry

Ash́ford, Nicholas A.; Heaton, George R.

doi:10.2307/1191559

Cited by 68 publications

(46 citation statements)

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“…This perspective has greatly influenced the literature on environmental management and prompted calls for more stringent government regulation to reduce the use of EOP treatment (Ashford andHeaton 1983, Porter andvan der Linde 1995). Yet, despite this prediction's importance to both research and practice, it has not been well tested empirically.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Scholars have arrived at an explanation by drawing on organizational theory that predicts managers will tend to pick the least disruptive response to new requirements (Galbraith 1974, Thompson 1967. According to this logic, EOP treatment is an attractive solution for managers, because although such systems can be financially costly to install and operate, they do not usually require disturbance of existing operations (Ashford andHeaton 1983, Cebon 1992). Indeed, to prevent firms from taking this easy way out, some scholars have suggested that government regulation should be stringent enough to discourage the use of EOP systems (Kemp 2000).…”

Section: Eop Treatment and Detrimental Impacts Onmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Judgment of Garbage: End-of-Pipe Treatment and Waste Reduction

Dutt

King

2014

Management Science

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M any scholars have argued that systems for treating waste impede organizations from preventing waste in the first place. They theorize that end-of-pipe (EOP) treatment diminishes the incentive to avoid creating waste in the production process and obscures the information necessary to devise prevention techniques. This prediction has been widely accepted, influencing both policy and practice, despite both a lack of supporting empirical evidence and the existence of a counterprediction. In this paper, we use data describing U.S. manufacturing establishments from 1991 to 2005 to test the connection between EOP treatment and waste reduction. Our findings show that EOP treatment is associated with an initial jump in reported waste, followed by ongoing reduction. We analyze these results by exploring mechanisms that may drive this relationship. For practitioners, our paper provides critical guidance about strategies for reducing waste. For scholars of environmental management, our paper provides new insight on when facilities accomplish "source reduction" of process waste. For broader management theories of operations and organizational design, our analysis provides new insight on boundary conditions for extrapolation from existing theories. Finally, our paper provides new guidance for the formulation of effective regulatory policy.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Eop Treatment and Detrimental Impacts Onmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Judgment of Garbage: End-of-Pipe Treatment and Waste Reduction

Dutt

King

2014

Management Science

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“…Similarly, the analysis of Grabowski, Vernon and Thomas (1978), reformulating a model previously developed by Baily (1972), suggests that other non-regulatory factors have an important aggregative effect on innovation. Thus, the decline in US productivity was not only caused by the tighter regulation introduced with the 1962 Amendments, but also by other factors such as the rise in costs, as a result of advances in the technology of safety testing, a general depletion of research opportunities and the Thalidomide incident which has made firms and physician more cautious (see also Ashford and Heaton, 1983;Backhaus, 1983;Wardell and Sheck, 1984;Wiggins, 1984).…”

Section: Some More Empirical Studies On Product Safety Regulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Product safety regulation

Weatherill¹

2013

EU Consumer Law and Policy

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Market failures paired with private law failures call for safety regulation. The main dilemma for policymakers is to find 'the optimal level' of product safety regulation. Hence, in this chapter science and cost-benefit analysis are presented as important technocratic tools for risk assessment and risk management. As product safety regulation covers a wide range of industrial activities, a variety of empirical studies have been reviewed. The lively controversies on the effectiveness of some regulations, often arisen among specialists, show how difficult the appraisal of cost and benefit of regulation is, especially in the presence of 'risk-compensation' behavior. JEL classification: K32

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“…work health and hazards and energy may provide the basis for competitive advahtages (e.g. Ashford & Heaton 1983). The survey revealed that 24.2 percent of all firms had experienced positive consequences of public regulation.…”

Section: Contacts To Bureaucratsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Negotiated Economy? Public Regulation of the Manufacturing Sector in Denmark

Christiansen

1994

Scand Pol Stud

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The concept of the negotiated economy intuitively catches important developments in statemarket relations. The fruitfulness of the recent development of the negotiated economy as a macro concept is questioned. Two theses deduced from the concept are tested against public regulation of the Danish manufacturing sector. Although regulatory demands on manufacturing firms have increased the complexity of the political environment of firms. the negotiated economy is not an adequate theoretical concept for describing and explaining the increased interdependence of state and market. The negotiated economy might be useful at the sector or sub-sector level, but for empirical analysis the concept should be more precisely defined.

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Regulation and Technological Innovation in the Chemical Industry

Abstract: The observation that innovation often occurs without R&D has important implications for the argument that, because regulation may divert resources from R&D, innovation is necessarily adversely affected. See infa section III(D) () (e). 4. S. MYERS & D.

Cited by 68 publications

References 0 publications

The Judgment of Garbage: End-of-Pipe Treatment and Waste Reduction

The Judgment of Garbage: End-of-Pipe Treatment and Waste Reduction

Product safety regulation

A Negotiated Economy? Public Regulation of the Manufacturing Sector in Denmark

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