2009
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.02037.x
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Regulation and Supervision of Financial Intermediaries in the EU: The Aftermath of the Financial Crisis*

Abstract: The financial crisis has reopened debate on the architecture of financial regulation and prudential supervision in the EU, calling into question the home country control principle that has prevailed since the mid-1980s. This article discusses how the growth of cross-border financial intermediation can best be regulated to limit the ensuing risks of financial contagion. It argues that a supranational supervisory system is now needed for some intermediaries, but that proximity to market actors at national level … Show more

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citations
Cited by 52 publications
(38 citation statements)
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References 8 publications
(10 reference statements)
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“…Not so in the UK, where 'light touch' regulation is still preferred, and where reform finds an impervious terrain, showing how the conflicting interests of EU member states are significant (Begg 2009). Regulating financial operations is problematic for the EU because of the clashes between national sensitivities.…”
Section: Cross-border Consequencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Not so in the UK, where 'light touch' regulation is still preferred, and where reform finds an impervious terrain, showing how the conflicting interests of EU member states are significant (Begg 2009). Regulating financial operations is problematic for the EU because of the clashes between national sensitivities.…”
Section: Cross-border Consequencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Disagreements are hard to avoid when discussing how best to reach a coherent approach to cross-border risks and burden-sharing. 'The UK has sought to avoid a dominant role for EU bodies in supervision which could pose a competitive threat to the City of London' (Begg 2009(Begg : 1121 Changing the rules amounts to interfering with both domestic and European legislation. A further problem arises from the fact that the euro area and the EU have different forms and intensity of membership, so that the interplay between monetary policy and financial regulation is complicated and 'raises questions about which institution should take the lead at EU level' (Begg 2009(Begg : 1114.…”
Section: Cross-border Consequencesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Šie veiksniai yra išsamiai analizuoti ir įvertinti plačiame mokslinės analizės kontekste (Ingves, 2007;Stichele, 2008;Begg, 2009;Masciandaro, Nieto, Quintyn, 2009;Masciandaro, Pansini, Quintyn, 2011;Ludwig-Vogler, Giernalczyk, 2010;Miklaszewska, 2011;Novickytė, Jasienė, 2011;Novickytė, 2012), nurodant, kad jie gali būti priežastis bankams jungtis (siekti sąnaudų sinergijos, įgyvendinti kitus nematerialios sinergijos tikslus).…”
Section: Tyrimo Rezultataiunclassified
“…The author submits that a more European approach to supervision is necessary. As Mervyn King and Lord Turner favour the subsidiary model, the implication is that the host supervisor will have more role in supervising foreign banks (33). This is necessary to ensure that foreign banks' levels of capital and liquidity are sufficient.…”
Section: Branch Subsidiarymentioning
confidence: 99%