Regulating the New Self-Employed in the Uber Economy: What Role for EU Competition Law?

Abstract

This paper discusses the role that EU competition law can play in regulating the “new self-employed”—precarious workers formally considered to be micro-enterprises. Specific attention is paid to the newest type of “new self-employed,” namely those engaged via matchmaking platforms arranging for work to be contracted on demand. Despite their unequal bargaining position, self-employed individuals are barred from collective bargaining due to the EU competition rules. This Article argues that the problem will not be solved by modifying the respective tests for “worker” and “undertaking” in EU law, or by introducing exceptions under Article 101 TFEU. This Article then adopts a regulatory approach to canvass the different legal instruments available to address exploitation concerns in the context of the Uber economy, and discusses the role that EU competition law can play in such a regime.

Having their cake and eating it too? Online labor platforms and human resource management as a case of institutional complexity

“…Deliveroo) (Duggan et al, 2020;Meijerink & Keegan, 2019). Although paid for their services, gig workers do not have an employment relationship with an organization (Aloisi, 2016;Daskalova, 2018). Rather, they are classified as independent freelancers by platform firms who facilitate their access to requesters.…”

“…The venture capital-based discounts may however prove unsustainable over time if rival platforms also seek to create network externalities. In such cases, the online platform with the largest financial resources is likely to drive competitors out, which creates a monopsony/monopoly allowing the remaining platform to reduce subsidies and increase commission fees to grow revenue (Daskalova, 2018;Meijerink & Keegan, 2019).…”

“…Some argue that online labor platforms work with freelancers to avoid having to apply labor laws, thereby avoiding the associated costs (taxes, social security, paid holidays, etc.) (Aloisi, 2016;Daskalova, 2018;Rosenblat & Stark, 2016). Working with self-employed workers also enables platform firms to exit a market at a low cost (by not having to terminate employment contracts of their workers) if they cannot outcompete rival platforms.…”

Conceptualizing the Gig Economy and Its Regulatory Problems

“…Gig workers can decide to opt in to become an employee of the platform (enjoying a minimum wage, holiday pay, sick pay, and a contribution to their pension savings) once they have worked for Hilfr for 100 hours, or they can decide to opt out (Aloisi, 2019). However, collective wage bargaining by gig workers may meet resistance in competition law, given their status as independent contractors in most countries (Daskalova, 2018).…”

Negotiating the Digital Transformation of Work: Non-Standard Workers’ Voice, Collective Rights and Mobilisation Practices in the Platform Economy

“…The CJEU's posture seems problematic in a context of growing casualisation of labour. An increasing number of self-employed workers are not able to determine their conduct in the market independently, due to the nature of the commitments or to a situation of subordination and/or dependence on the client (Biasi, 2018;Daskalova, 2017). The clear implication of the judicial position is that for them it is not possible to bargain collectively without facing the risk that the outcome of such negotiation may be vulnerable from a legal point of view, thus undermining the actual exercise of this right.…”