Regulating Immigration Control: Carrier Sanctions in the Netherlands

Abstract

This article attempts to put carrier sanctions policies in a broad perspective by looking at the immigration context, the rationale behind the policy, the changing character of borders and the regulatory environment of this policy. Carrier sanction legislation can be understood as a remote control instrument, which is supplementary to controls before and at the border and internal controls, whereby the concept of the border as a line between states is abandoned. The second part of the article focuses on the implementation of the carrier sanctions policy in the Netherlands. The Dutch government tries to overcome the principal-agent dilemma arising from involving a third party in enforcement, by installing a system of 'contiguous measures', both negative and positive, to stimulate carriers to perform controls on their passengers' documents. Responsibilities are imposed on carriers but the state, by using 'soft' and 'hard touch' legislation, remains in control.

The Complex Sources of Immigration Control

“…One determinant of the extent to which immigration enforcement occurs in a given country is the capacity of its immigration agency to train and equip officials to enforce the law. However, in most countries, immigration officials and immigration departments form a small part of a much broader immigration enforcement infrastructure (Lahav 1998; Wishnie 2004; Scholten and Minderhoud 2008; Coleman and Kocher 2011; Leerkes, Varsanyi, and Engbersen 2012). One of the earliest formulations of this idea was Aristide Zolberg’s (2005) concept of “remote control,” which refers to the manner in which governments have extended both the prerogative and responsibility to enforce immigration laws to other bureaucratic agents within the state, to officials of foreign states, and to non-state actors.…”

The Palgrave Handbook of International Labour Migration

“…Examples of such outward shifts of control are presented in studies of carrier sanctions, fines imposed on private transport companies that carry persons who do not hold the necessary documents to enter the EU (Scholten and Minderhoud, 2008), employer sanctions (De Lange, 2011) and outsourcing of control in general (Gammeltoft- Hansen and Sorensen, 2012), among others of detention centres (Menz, 2011). From these examples, which I term forms of 'coercive privatization', we can distinguish 'permissive privatization': where the state makes private parties jointly responsible for the design of the admission policy and for decision making on admissions instead of decisions on control and sanctions.…”

Examining hidden coercion at state borders: why carrier sanctions cannot be justified

“…38 This leads to a legal problem, to be discussed below. In some cases, such as for migration to the Netherlands, and in some cases, to Belgium, and the UK, for example, Immigration Liaison Officers (ILOs) check the documents and 'advise' airlines, though 'the final decision whether or not to carry a passenger lies with the airlines', 39 forcing private companies to assume responsibility for difficult decisions. For example, in 2004, in over 99% of Dutch cases, the advice of ILOs was followed by the airlines.…”